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Socio-environmental valuation and liabilities 
What strategies for environmental justice organisations? 
Abstract 
This EJOLT report focuses on two central issues: the use of evaluation methods 
and the notion of liabilities, as applied to socio-environmental conflicts and EJO 
campaigns. The report includes (i) one review chapter of extra-judicial cases 
having a valuation dimension, (ii) six case studies from four continents involving a 
close collaboration between activists and academics, and (iii) one practical-
theoretical synthesis. Each one of the case studies examines one or more of the 
following key questions: How are valuation conflicts to be dealt with? How can we 
evaluate a given ‘development project’? Is it possible to compensate for the 
liabilities involved? If yes, how? More specifically, two chapters are concerned 
with environmental impact assessments (oil exploitation in Nigeria and water 
megaproject in Brazil), two chapters tackle cost/benefit approaches and their limits 
(forest valuation in India and nuclear power plants in Bulgaria and Turkey), one 
deals with multicriteria evaluations (oil exploitation in Ecuador), and one analyses 
a conflict of valuation languages (gold mining in Turkey). Among these case 
studies, two (Nigeria and India) also discuss the compensatory mechanisms 
involved as well as their suitability. 
When dealing with environmental decision-making or conflict resolution, the 
approach of standard economics (even when labelled ‘environmental’) is to use a 
common unit – a monetary numeraire – for all the different values and then to look 
for a trade-off between all of them within a market context. This approach 
assumes the existence of value commensurability. Ecological economists and 
activists, in contrast, acknowledge value incommensurability. They argue that it is 
misleading to reduce the diversity of languages of valuation (e.g., livelihood, 
identity, territorial rights, spirituality, aesthetics) to a single monetary measure that 
denies the legitimacy of other languages. Indeed, in virtually every socio-
environmental conflict, a variety of valuation languages is deployed. Their 
inclusion in evaluation processes is particularly important since governments and 
companies usually try to portray socio-environmental impacts solely as a technical 
problem that will be handled with the proper use of technology or monetary 
accounting. In fact, most of the case studies in this report show that lower-income 
sectors (especially indigenous people and peasants) do not simply seek a 
monetary compensation and do worry about local environmental matters. In many 
cases therefore, monetary compensation is likely not going to be sufficient to 
resolve disagreements. 
More fundamentally, these valuation contests also highlight opposite visions and 
values about local development, between on one hand (lower-income) locals and 
on the other, the state and corporate sectors. In view of the differences in material 
interests, values and perceptions, it appears that the evolution of most socio-
environmental conflicts will very much depend on the extent to which different 
languages of valuation are acknowledged and addressed. Generally speaking, 
this would require, firstly, carrying out a rigorous socio-environmental impacts 
assessment of the region at stake, and secondly, undertaking an in-depth 
deliberative multicriteria evaluation. 
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Foreword 
Foreword 
 
 
 
Conflicts over resource extraction or waste disposal increase in number as the 
world economy uses more materials and energy. Civil society organisations 
(CSOs) active in Environmental Justice issues focus on the link between the need 
for environmental security and the defence of basic human rights. 
The EJOLT project (Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade, 
www.ejolt.org) is an FP7 Science in Society project that runs from 2011 to 2015. 
EJOLT brings together a consortium of 23 academic and civil society 
organisations across a range of fields to promote collaboration and mutual 
learning among stakeholders who research or use Sustainability Sciences, 
particularly on aspects of Ecological Distribution. One main goal is to empower 
environmental justice organisations (EJOs), and the communities they support 
that receive an unfair share of environmental burdens to defend or reclaim their 
rights. This will be done through a process of two-way knowledge transfer, 
encouraging participatory action research and the transfer of methodologies with 
which EJOs, communities and citizen movements can monitor and describe the 
state of their environment, and document its degradation, learning from other 
experiences and from academic research how to argue in order to avoid the 
growth of environmental liabilities or ecological debts. Thus EJOLT will increase 
EJOs’ capacity in using scientific concepts and methods for the quantification of 
environmental and health impacts, increasing their knowledge of environmental 
risks and of legal mechanisms of redress. On the other hand, EJOLT will greatly 
enrich research in the Sustainability Sciences through mobilising the accumulated 
‘activist knowledge’ of the EJOs and making it available to the sustainability 
research community. Finally, EJOLT will help translate the findings of this mutual 
learning process into the policy arena, supporting the further development of 
evidence-based decision making and broadening its information base. We focus 
on the use of concepts such as ecological debt, environmental liabilities and 
ecologically unequal exchange, in science and in environmental activism and 
policy-making. 
The overall aim of EJOLT is to improve policy responses to and support 
collaborative research on environmental conflicts through capacity building of 
environmental justice groups and multi-stakeholder problem solving. A key aspect 
is to show the links between increased metabolism of the economy (in terms of 
energy and materials), and resource extraction and waste disposal conflicts so as 
to answer the driving questions: Which are the causes of increasing ecological 
distribution conflicts at different scales, and how to turn such conflicts into forces 
for environmental sustainability? 
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Foreword 
Within this background, this report focuses on the valuation of environmental 
liabilities, based on different strategies that EJOs have employed in well-known 
cases of environmental injustice. Diverse valuation languages are deployed in 
every socio-environmental conflict. Such diversity is often neglected in the 
assessment of environmental liabilities. However, as the authors of the report 
argue, the evolution these conflicts often depends on the extent to which different 
languages of valuation are acknowledged and addressed. 
The report analyses valuation strategies in different cases, related with the 
extraction of oil, biomass, minerals and water, and also with the expansion of the 
nuclear industry. Based on such an assorted source of evidence, the authors draw 
attention to the need of, carrying out a rigorous socio-environmental impacts 
assessment of the region at stake, and from there, undertaking in-depth 
deliberative multicriteria evaluations. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Today’s global economy has a colossal appetite for materials and energy. As 
depletion occurs, or as expansion is required, mining, dams, plantations and 
industries are on the march. They are little by little reaching every remaining 
corner of the planet, undermining the environment in ever more regions as well as 
the conditions of existence of local populations who complain accordingly. 
The growth dynamics of capitalism generates ecologically unequal exchange and 
gives rise to what Martínez-Alier calls ecological distribution conflicts. The latter 
are today as significant as the more classic struggles between capital and labour. 
However, these conflicts do not uniquely result from metabolic patterns per se, as 
if such patterns were disconnected from the rest of society. Firstly, protests are 
also directed against an institutional configuration that defines the room for 
manoeuvre of private or state-own companies and therefore of a particular 
metabolic system. Secondly, these conflicts are expressed as a struggle over 
valuation, the issue at stake in the present EJOLT Report. This report includes six 
case studies from four continents and involves a close collaboration between 
activists and academics. Each one of the chapters tacklesone or more of the 
following central questions: 
 How are valuation contests to be dealt with? 
 How can we evaluate a given ‘development project’? 
 How can we assess social and ecological costs? 
 Is it possible to compensate for the liabilities involved? If yes, how? 
While keeping in mind that this report is intended for the concrete work of EJOs, 
we will focus on two core issues: evaluation methods and the notion of 
compensation for liabilities. Two chapters are concerned with environmental 
impact assessments (oil exploitation in Nigeria and water megaproject in Brazil), 
two chapters tackle cost/benefit approaches and their limits (forest valuation in 
India and nuclear plants in Bulgaria and Turkey), one deals with multicriteria 
evaluations (oil exploitation in Ecuador), and one analyses a conflict of valuation 
languages (gold mining in Turkey). Among these case studies, two (Nigeria and 
India) also tackle the compensatory mechanisms involved as well as their 
appropriateness. 
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1.1 Evaluation methods 
When dealing with environmental decision-making or conflict resolution, the 
approach of standard economics (even when labelled ‘environmental’) is to use a 
common unit – a monetary numeraire – for all the different values and then to look 
for a trade-off between all of them within a market context. This approach 
assumes the existence of value commensurability. Ecological economists, in 
contrast, acknowledge value incommensurability and this is one of their founding 
principles (Martínez-Alier et al., 1998). Nobody knows how to convincingly 
estimate the monetary price of cultural, social, or ecological impacts of economic 
activities. In EJOLT, we argue that it is misleading to try to reduce the diversity of 
languages of valuation (e.g., livelihood, identity, territorial rights, sacredness, 
aesthetic) to a single monetary measure that denies the legitimacy of other 
languages. If we accept value incommensurability, it appears that a framework 
that includes all the stakeholders is the only way to satisfactorily evaluate a given 
project or situation. Together with serious impact assessments, participatory 
multicriteria evaluation (MCE) methods can help to reach compromise solutions 
(see Gerber et al., 2013, EJOLT Report No 8.). In the real world, however, it is 
usually the most powerful actor who imposes his or her own language of 
valuation. When it is the case, conflicts may obviously be the only way to 
challenge power relations and to advance towards more equity and sustainability 
(Martínez-Alier, 2002). 
 
1.2. Liabilities 
When dealing with corporate or historical liabilities, EJOs usually rapidly face a 
hostile reaction from the private sector and/or governments. At a macro-level, 
consider for example the exchange that occurred in 2009 between the US and 
Bolivian negotiators during the UN conference on climate change in Copenhagen. 
Todd Stern, the US negotiator, said “We absolutely recognize our historic role in 
putting emissions in the atmosphere, up there that are there now, but the sense of 
guilt or culpability or reparations – I just categorically reject that” (press conference 
of December 10, 2009). The response of Pablo Solón, the then Bolivian 
ambassador to the UN and today the director of the EJO Focus on the Global 
South, was to suggest that responsibility for past emissions does carry obligations 
of current reparations: “To us it seems only right that the polluter should pay, and 
not the poor. We are not assigning guilt, merely responsibility. As they say in the 
US, if you break it, you buy it”. 
As O’Neill puts it, the exchange turns on the scope of legal and moral liability and 
its relation to responsibility (O’Neill, 2013). Stern’s position is that while causal 
responsibility can be historically assigned to polluters and consumers in the US for 
past emissions, moral responsibility cannot be assigned and therefore no liability. 
Solón’s position, on the other hand, is that even if there is no moral responsibility 
and culpability for the emissions, the causal responsibility does establish some 
form of liability. 
It is misleading to try 
to reduce the 
diversity of languages 
of valuation to a 
single monetary 
measure that denies 
the legitimacy of 
other languages. 
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The argument typically used by EJOs appeals to fairness in the distribution of 
benefits and harms. To expect others to clean up the mess one makes is 
“incompatible with equal respect and equal dignity”, since it treats them as akin to 
servants (Shue, 1999: 535, quoted in O’Neill, 2013).There is also a strong 
argument that membership of a collective and benefits from past injustice are 
jointly sufficient conditions for the inheritance of responsibility to compensation 
and reparation. In most practical cases, the question of whether this or other lines 
of argument for liability are successful is one that is settled through legal actions 
as well as through social mobilizations. 
After a review chapter of extra-judicial cases having a valuation dimension, the six 
case studies are presented, before a practical-theoretical synthesis is suggested, 
together with some concluding remarks. 
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2 Valuation of liabilities in extra-judicial contexts 
 
2 
Valuation of 
liabilities in  
extra-judicial 
contexts 
 
Beatriz Rodríguez-Labajos 
 
 
Has some number become better than no number? This question posed by Kling 
et al. (2012) goes beyond the traditional tension in economics between those in 
favour and those against the allocation of a money figure to value environmental 
change. It is a valid proposition in case of decisions seeking a balance between 
appropriate reparation of environmental damage, and the technical and ethical 
complexities of commensuration.  
This chapter aims at contributing to the literature on the calculation of liabilities 
from environmental damages caused by either private or governmental actors. 
The purpose is to understand, based on a review of secondary sources and legal 
documents, how liabilities have been estimated based on existing experiences in 
extra-judicial contexts; that is, in situations where settlements have been agreed 
outside the courts. 
 
2.1 What are the so-called damages? The basic 
distinction between damage and liability 
Both in the literature and in practice, a significant distinction should be made 
between the so-called damages and the liabilities stemming from them. Such a 
distinction is relevant to understand the reasons argued in - and outside - the 
courts and therefore the role of valuation within legal proceedings. 
The literature conceptualising ecological debt (Paredis et al., 2008) establishes 
three categories of ecological damage: 
A significant 
distinction should be 
made between the so-
called damages and 
the liabilities 
stemming from them 
  
 
 
Page 14 
 
 
2 Valuation of liabilities in extra-judicial contexts 
 contamination, understood as the introduction of substances into the 
environment in quantities higher than those naturally based there, causing 
harm to human beings, animals, and ecosystems plants and the cultural 
and social heritage;  
 over-use or the extraction and use of natural resources at a rate or level 
which means that the extraction is time-limited at a certain quality level; and 
 degradation that implies a structural change in landscape and/or 
ecosystems, provoking a quality reduction in the diversity or productivity of 
this landscape or ecosystems. 
The legal definitions of damage are more restrictive. The Directive 2004/35/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, 
known as the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD), defines environmental 
damage as the “direct or indirect damage caused to the aquatic environment, flora 
and fauna and natural habitats protected by the Natura 2000 network, as well as 
direct or indirect contamination of the soil which could lead to a serious risk to 
human health”. According to the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (33 U.S.C. 2701-
2761; 33 U.S.C § 2702(b)(2), damage “means injury to natural resources, to real 
or personal property, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, loss of 
governmental revenues, loss of profits or earning capacity, and increased cost of 
additional public services. Damages also include the cost of assessing these 
injuries”. 
On the term liability, the ELD indicates that "[e]nvironmental liability aims at 
making the causer of environmental damage (the polluter) pay for remedying the 
damage that he has caused. (…) It applies to environmental damage and the risk 
of damage resulting from commercial activities, once it is possible to establish a 
causal link between the damage and the activity in question” (author’s Italics). In 
the same vein, the US Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund) restricts liabilities to 
“responsible parties' obligations to pay for cleanup costs [of] hazardous substance 
releases and contamination problems that pose a threat to public health and the 
environment” (author’s Italics). 
At the international scale, the concept of liability has been operationalised in 
diverse circumstances. Therefore, a variety of treaties address civil responsibilities 
in the operation of activities entailing risk of damage in different sectors (Table 1). 
It is worth mentioning that in Spanish, the term liability is often translated as 
‘pasivo ambiental’. However, the term ‘pasivo ambiental’ is also used to designate 
a physical place or material process directly related with the pollution or damage 
caused (e.g. accumulation of hazardous substances or waste) by a company 
along its operation phase. This is related with the idea that, while generating a 
physical transformation thought its operation, the company is creating a debt that 
at some point should be compensated. While highly relevant for the debate on 
ecological debt, in this chapter, the term liability is not used with this meaning. 
"Environmental 
liability aims at 
making the causer of 
environmental 
damage (the polluter) 
pay for remedying the 
damage that he has 
caused.” 
  
 
 
Page 15 
 
 
2 Valuation of liabilities in extra-judicial contexts 
 Date enacted Title Region Topic 
1 29/07/1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy Global Nuclear 
2 21/05/1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Global Nuclear 
3 21/05/1963 Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes Global - 
4 29/11/1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) Global Oil 
5 17/12/1971 
Convention relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of 
Nuclear Materials (NUCLEAR) 
Global Nuclear 
6 18/12/1971 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 
Global Oil 
7 17/02/1973 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) 
Global Maritime claims 
8 19/11/1976 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC 
Convention) 
Global Maritime claims 
9 10/12/1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Global Maritime claims 
10 21/09/1988 
Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the 
Paris Convention 
Global - 
11 27/11/1992 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 (IOPC Fund) 
Global Oil 
12 21/06/1993 
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment 
Europe - 
13 02/05/1996 
Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims, 1976 (LLMC Protocol) 
Global Maritime claims 
14 03/05/1996 
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by 
Sea (HNS Convention) 
Global 
Hazardous / Noxious 
substances 
15 12/09/1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage Global Nuclear 
16 12/03/1999 International Convention on the Arrest of Ships Global Maritime claims 
17 10/12/1999 
Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
Global Waste 
18 23/05/2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage Global Oil 
19 30/11/2001 
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities 
Global Oil 
20 21/05/2003 
Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters 
to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 
Europe 
Transboundary 
hazards 
21 08/08/2006 
Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary 
Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities 
Global 
Transboundary 
hazards 
 
 
 
2.2 Environmental liabilities in the scientific 
literature 
Despite the high dynamism of the discussion on environmental liabilities between 
activists and practitioners, the scientific literature does not seem to address this 
issue at the needed pace. A search in the Thomson Reuter Web of Knowledge
SM
 
using the search ‘liabilit*’ and ‘valuation*’ and (method* or court case*) only 
Table 1: International treaties on Environmental Responsibility and Liability 
Source: Adapted from University of Oslo, Treaty Database (http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/). 
Date of access: 06/03/2013. 
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2 Valuation of liabilities in extra-judicial contexts 
allowed identifying thirteen relevant references after a selection of suitable 
materials through reading titles and abstracts (Table 2). 
 
Contribution Source 
Theoretical 
framework for 
valuation of 
liabilities, 
sometimes under 
specific US / EU 
regulations  
Concepts and theory 
(Jones and Pease 1997, O'Connor 
1997, Rhee 2012)(Geistfeld 2011) 
Net environmental benefit analysis from 
remediation / restoration 
(Efroymson et al. 2004) 
Indexed discount rate for fair valuation (McLaughlin 1998) 
Value-based equivalency method 
(under European ELD) 
(Martin-Ortega et al. 2011) 
Valuation exercises in the context of specific lawsuits (Duffield 1997, Jones 2000) 
Lessons from 
paradigmatic oil 
spill cases 
Exxon Valdez 
(Duffield 1997, Carson and Walsh 
2008, Kling et al. 2012) 
Other / international comparison (Santopietro 1998, Dicks 2008) 
 
A fist type of contributions addresses conceptual proposals and frameworks for 
the valuation of liabilities, while only a small group of papers assesses valuation 
exercises in the context of specific lawsuits. In this respect, there is a clear 
dominance of contributions encompassing lessons for valuation from paradigmatic 
oil spill cases, being the Exxon Valdez oil spill the most publicised one. This case 
stands out because it was the first prominent use of the contingent valuation 
method to estimate damage in the context of big environmental liabilities. The 
estimates, ranging between USD 3-15 billion, were remarkably higher that the 
pure clean-up expenses, which at that time was considered as proxy of people’s 
preferences for non-use values of biodiversity. The out-of-court settlement in that 
case entailed agreement between Exxon and the US government, the State of 
Alaska and other parties of ca USD 1 billion (See Table 3). 
 
Part of the settlement 
 Amount 
(USD 
million) 
Criminal plea agreement Remitted by the court in recognition of Exxon’s 
cooperation in cleaning up the spill 
(125) 
Victims of Crime Fund 13 
North American Wetlands Conservation Fund 12 
Criminal restitution State Government 50 
Federal Government 50 
Civil settlement Reimbursement to Federal and State governments for 
damage assessment and spill response 
213.1 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council 686.9 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Selection of peer-
review literature on the 
valuation of 
environmental 
liabilities 
Source: Own 
elaboration, based on 
search done 06/03/2013 
Table 3 
The Exxon Valdez Oil 
spill settlement 
Source: Adapted from 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
Trustee Council 
(www.evostc.state.ak.us) 
In the scientific 
literature there is a 
clear dominance of 
contributions 
encompassing 
lessons for valuation 
from paradigmatic oil 
spill cases, being the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill 
the most publicised 
one. 
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2 Valuation of liabilities in extra-judicial contexts 
2.3. Examples of valuation methodologies, before 
and aside the courts 
2.3.1. Guidelines for prevention of pollution in the marine 
environment  
Among the treaties listed in Table 1, the topic of maritime claims provides good 
examples of generally applicable guidelines for the demarcation of liabilities, for a 
milieu characterized by intense exposure to damage. In the context of global 
environmental justice, this type of claims is relevant because of the role played by 
cargo fleet trade the international transport of commodities. In particular, two main 
conventions (7 and 9 in Table 1) seem to be of particular relevant for the purpose 
of this chapter.  
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 (Marpol 73/78) is the main international 
convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships 
from operational or accidental causes (International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
2013). The instrument entered into force on October 1983 and it has been has 
been updated by amendments through the years. It includes different possible 
sources of dumping (oil, noxious and harmful substances, sewage, and garbage) 
and air pollution.  
 
The text does not mention any particular method for the valuation of liabilities, 
although the art. 4(4) indicates that the penalties “shall be adequate in severity to 
discourage violations of the Convention and shall be equally severe irrespective of 
where the violations occur”. The contribution of this treaty consists in specific 
procedures for the prevention of pollution, technical description of terms, and 
categorisation and listing of substances according to the hazard to marine 
resources or human health. In the context of oil pollution prevention, the Appendix 
8 give details on a method for probabilistic oil outflow calculation in case of 
collision or stranding. Outflow parameters allow the generation of the so-called oil 
spill number (EOS number). In Marpol 73/78 the term damage is used in three 
ways: injures from pollution in amenities or other uses of the sea (e.g. art. 2); 
losses for the activity of the ship due to unduly detentions or delays (e.g. art.7); 
Map 1  
Parties to the MARPOL 73/78 
convention on marine 
pollution 
Source: Wikimedia Commons / 
jrockley 
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failure or breakdown of ship or its equipments (e.g. Appendix of the convention). 
The latter is the most common usage in the Convention. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), into force since 
1994, replaced the old concept of ‘freedom of the seas’ by defining the rights and 
responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing 
guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine 
natural resources. Aside from its provisions defining ocean boundaries, the 
convention establishes general obligations for safeguarding the marine 
environment and protecting freedom of scientific research on the high seas. It also 
creates an innovative legal regime for controlling mineral resource exploitation in 
deep seabed areas beyond national jurisdiction, through an International Seabed 
Authority and the Common heritage of mankind principle. 
UNCLOS (Art. 235) includes provisions on ‘Responsibility and Liability’. This 
article requires the states, in general terms, to fulfill their obligations to protect and 
preserve the marine environment and makes them liable in this respect. This 
involves adequate compensations for damage by pollution by persons under the 
states’ jurisdiction. To this end, the convention urges the states to cooperate in the 
development of criteria and procedures for payment, such as insurance or 
compensation funds. This article is then just a framework for further liability and 
compensation conventions, which were developed particularly in relation to oil 
pollution damage and the carriage of hazardous and noxious substances by the 
sea, including carriage of nuclear material. 
 
2.3.2 UK Compensation Scheme for Radiation-linked Diseases 
The second example in this section is related to compensation schemes in the 
nuclear industry. In October of 1957, a fire in the reactor 1 of the Windscale power 
plant (in Cumbria, NW England) released radioactive materials to the 
environment. The accident, ranked at level 5 incident on the 7-point International 
Nuclear Event Scale, is considered the worst in the nuclear history of the UK. The 
plant was later renamed Sellafield and transferred to British Nuclear Fuels Limited 
(BNFL) and it is currently a nuclear reprocessing site.  
Map 2 
 Parties to the UNCLOS 
(as in February 2013) 
Dark green – ratified, Clear 
green - signed, but not 
ratified; Grey - did not sign 
Source: Wikimedia 
Commons / japinderum 
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Sellafield has been involved in a long-term controversy on the effects of nuclear 
facilities on human health. This also includes concerns on corporate control of 
research results, as they have been highly reliant on BNFL sponsorship 
(Waterhouse, 1994). Since the 1970s, trade union sponsored legal actions against 
BNFL alleging injury claims caused by occupational exposure to radiation. These 
cases were settled out of court. While the industry argues the difficulty of 
defending some of the cases in court (Lewis 2011), the agreements themselves 
demonstrated the real possibility of a successful claim in this case (Wakeford, 
2007). 
 
On this background a UK Compensation Scheme for Radiation-linked Diseases 
(www.csrld.org.uk) has been operating since 1982, originally for BNFL and its 
trade’s unions and currently for most of UK’s nuclear operators. The initiative 
provides a procedure of dispute resolution without involving litigation. Whenever 
an employee of the nuclear operator is diagnosed from a disease tagged as 
eligible (e.g. different forms of cancers or cataracts of the eye) and the radiation 
dose record is available, a causation probability (CP) is estimated. After a 
feedback procedure involving the employer and the claimant’s trade’s union, a 
level of payment is determined according to the ranges shown in Table 4. The 
base amount to be paid is agreed taking into account loss of earnings, pain and 
suffering and number of dependent children (Lewis, 2011).  
According to information published in the Compensation Scheme’s webpage 
(accessed on March 6, 2014), until 2013 1454 cases have been assessed, 139 of 
which have qualified for compensation payments, these amounting GBP 7.81 M. 
Most payments have been made for causation probability values lower than fifty 
percent, which according to some views are unlikely to have been successful in 
the law courts (Wakeford, 2007). 
Picture 1 
Aerial view of Sellafield in 
Cumbria, UK 
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Causation Probability Payment Band 
Less than 20% Nil 
20 – 29.9%  One quarter 
30 – 39.9% One half 
40 – 49.9%  Three-quarters 
50% and above Full 
 
2.3.3 Losses resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait 
A third example about calculation of liabilities is linked to the calculation of the 
losses resulting from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Based on a 
thorough review of the original files available, this section examines in-depth that 
process, the reasoning argued by the involved parties and the type of damages 
eventually considered for compensation.  
Evidence of severe impacts human health and environmental degradation, 
besides the virtual destruction of Kuwait’s oil industry followed the events of Iraq-
Kuwait War. According to some estimates, damaged wellheads released from 3-
10 million barrels of crude oil and 70-100 million m
3
 of natural gas per day (Al-
Damkhi et al., 2009). The environmental damage resulting from oil fires and oil 
lakes effects impaired the marine environment, groundwater resources and desert 
ecosystems. 
In the aftermath of the conflict, Iraq was declared liable “for any direct loss, 
damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, 
or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations”
1
. As such, the 
country was sanctioned to pay for war reparations through a compensation fund 
feed by the controversial UN’s Oil-for-Food Programme. Between 1991 and 2005, 
the United Nations Compensation Commission (www.uncc.ch), subsidiary organ 
 
 
1
    Resolution 687 (1991) of the UN Security Council. 
Picture 2  
Landsat images showing  
before, during and after 
the release of 1.5 billion 
barrels of oil into the 
environment, one of the 
largest oil spill in human 
history 
Foto credit: NASA's 
Goddard Space Flight 
Center, 
http://www.nasa.gov/missio
n_pages/landsat/news/40th-
top10-kuwait.html 
Table 4  
System of 
proportional 
recovery in the UK 
Compensation 
Scheme for 
Radiation-linked 
Diseases 
Source: Lewis, 2011 
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of the UN Security Council, operated with the mandate to process claims and pay 
compensations. The Secretary-General of the UN stated in 1991 that the 
commission was not “a court or an arbitral tribunal before which the parties 
appear; (…) [it was] a political organ that performs an essentially fact-finding 
function” (United Nations Security Council, 1991:7). 
The claims for damage to the environment (‘F4’ claims) fell into two broad groups. 
The first group comprised claims for environmental damage and the depletion of 
natural resources in the Persian Gulf region including those resulting from oil-well 
fires and the oil spills into the sea. The second group consisted of claims by 
Governments outside of the region that assisted to countries directly affected by 
the environmental damage. This assistance involved the mitigation of impacts 
from the oil-well fires, the prevention and cleaning up of pollution and the provision 
of materials and personnel. 
The definition of “direct environmental damage and depletion of natural resources” 
(United Nations Security Council, 1992: paragraph 35) included losses or 
expenses resulting from: 
“(a) Abatement and prevention of environmental damage, including expenses 
directly relating to fighting oil fires and stemming the flow of oil in coastal and 
international waters; 
(b) Reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment or 
future measures which can be documented as reasonably necessary to clean and 
restore the environment; 
(c) Reasonable monitoring and assessment of the environmental damage for the 
purposes of evaluating and abating the harm and restoring the environment; 
(d) Reasonable monitoring of public health and performing medical screenings for 
the purposes of investigation and combating increased health risks as a result of 
the environmental damage; and  
(e) Depletion of or damage to natural resources.” 
Further technical discussions concluded that the term ‘environmental damage’ 
was not restricted to points listed above and other direct losses or expenses (e.g. 
measures undertaken to prevent or abate harmful environmental impacts) were 
also accepted as claims, provided that there were attributable to Iraq’s invasion 
and occupation. The discussion on the eligibility of costs then carried with it a 
series of insights about the nature of damages. Two deserve particular attention in 
the context of this chapter. 
1. The lack of baseline information about the environmental conditions prior to the 
invasion made it difficult to distinguish between damage attributable to Iraq and 
damage that may be due either to factors unrelated or only partly attributable to 
the Iraq’s invasion and occupation. The panel concluded that the need of the 
studies to estimate the extent of damage and quantifying the losses was a result 
of the invasion. Therefore, their costs were eligible as a direct impact to be 
compensated, regardless if they eventually unveiled unconnected damages.  
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2. Many of the costs were related to restoration practices. The parts were aware 
that the environment was not in pristine condition prior to Iraq’s invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait. That triggered a discussion about a) the suitability of 
remediation approaches or techniques in relation to the extent of the damage 
caused by the invasion, and b) the limits of Iraq’s liability. According to Iraq, 
compensation should not be awarded for measures to restore the environment to 
a ‘pristine condition’, because that would result in ‘unjust enrichment’ for the 
claimants, who may have neglected the environmental quality of the region. In 
relation to these points, the Panel determined that it was a duty of the claimants to 
prevent and mitigate environmental damage, accepting that the complete 
recreation of the pre-existing physical conditions could not be always feasible. 
However, Iraq was liable to pay the proportion of the costs of remediation that 
could reasonably be attributed to the invasion and occupation of Kuwait (United 
Nations Security Council, 2002).  
The total compensation sought by claims, including all cost categories, exceeded 
USD 352.5 billion of which only 14.48 percent was awarded. The Commission 
received approximately 170 ‘F4’ claims seeking a total of about USD 80 billion in 
compensation of which only USD 5.26 billion were awarded, approximately 10 
percent of the total compensation 
2
.  
Tables 5 and 6 compile information based on the recommendations of the panels 
of commissioners, and show significantly higher aggregated amounts (in the order 
of 3 times the amount reported above). The difference may respond either to 
corrections due to procedural rules or to more restrictive decisions from the 
Governing Council in charge of approving the recommendations of the panels. 
Despite this discrepancy, and having in mind that this is the only information made 
public by the Commission at this level of detail, the data is used here to 
understand the kind of accepted claims in this process. Information from six 
reports has been organised and summarised according to the method used for the 
calculation of the costs, inferred from the explanation of each one of the claims. 
Table 5 shows that most of claims were due to restoration costs from combined 
causes, often including oil spills and oil fires. Restoration costs represented two 
thirds of the total claims, and involved measures such as cleaning up oil spills, 
removing oil and military equipment, or remediating areas (terrestrial, marine, built 
environment) or resources (e.g. aquifers) damaged by the effects of oil fires, 
accumulation of tarcrete or oil pollution in general. Some costs of medical 
treatments have been also registered as health restoration costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2      
Status of Processing and Payment of Claims, as on 24 January 2013. Available online at webpage 
of the United Nations Compensation Commission (www.uncc.ch/status.htm). 
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Type of cost 
(calculation method) 
Cause of the claims 
Combined Oil spill Oil fire 
Mines and 
ordnance 
Fortification
/ road 
Refugees 
Monitoring 
needs 
Total general 
Restoration costs 7 013.4 2 647.0 291.6 683.4 1088.0 3.4 - 
11726.8 
66.53% 
Replacement cost 
(compensatory projects) 
5 618.1 - - - - 0.05 - 
5618.1 
31.88% 
Monitoring cost - -  - - - 247.5 
247.5 
1.40% 
Production function 
based approach 
- - 24.0 - - - - 
24.0 
0.14% 
Preventive expenditure - 1.7 - 7.0 - - - 
8.7 
0.05% 
Total costs (USD Million) 
                  (Percentage) 
12 631.5 
71.67% 
2 648.7 
15.03% 
315.6 
1.79% 
690.4 
3.92% 
1 088.0 
6.17% 
3.4 
0.02% 
247.5 
1.40% 
17 625.1 
100% 
 
 
 
 
In some cases, terrestrial or marine ecosystems were considered as irreversibly 
lost, with no possibility of restoration. In this case, the panel accepted a 
methodology proposed by the claimants (the habitat equivalency analysis, HEA
3
) 
to estimate the size of terrestrial nature areas (either in the same area or at other 
locations) that would provide benefits form ecosystem services equivalent to those 
that were lost as a result of the environmental damage. Then resources were 
applied to establish compensatory projects (e.g. protected areas of the same 
size). This kind of cost is classified as a replacement cost. Together with other 
compensatory projects in face of resource depletion (such as soil, shoreline 
resources and wildlife) encompassed around thirty percent of the total 
 
 
3
    The HEA methodology was introduced in the fifth and final report of the panel (United Nations 
Security Council 2005), which included most of the claims related to loss of or depletion to natural 
resources.  This methodology was the strategy to allocate a monetary value on (often non-
marketed) damaged natural resources without attributing monetary value to the ecosystem 
services themselves. HEA has proved to be helpful to establish a monetary range for potential 
settlement negotiation in court cases, but it is highly sensitive to several restrictive assumptions, 
described in detail by Dunford et al.( 2004). In the context of the claims for the invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait, Iraq contended that the HEA methodology provided abstract and theoretical 
results, that would not be acceptable by international treaties or other national or international 
practices and that compensation should only be paid for financially assessable actual damages. 
The Panel acknowledged the potential difficulties of the methodology, without considered them a 
sufficient reason for its rejection. The following clarifications were made: 1) HEA results would only 
be accepted as a base for claims after a thorough examination of its suitability in relation to extent 
of damage and the quantification of compensation in the circumstances of each claim. 2) When the 
available evidence pointed out uncompensated losses even after restoration measures have been 
undertaken, HEA could be used as a helpful tool in determining how much compensation (i.e. 
compensatory restoration) should be recommended (United Nations Security Council, 2005). 
Table 5. Awarded claimed amounts according to type of costs and cause of claims (in USD Million) 
Source: Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Reports and Recommendations of the Panels of 
Commissioners (United Nations Security Council 2001, United Nations Security Council 2002, United Nations Security 
Council 2003, United Nations Security Council 2004a, United Nations Security Council 2004b, United Nations Security 
Council 2005), available at: www.uncc.ch 
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recommended compensation. Monitoring and assessment of damages, including 
investigation on health risks, was considered a claim that could be accepted as 
direct environmental damage and represented 1.4 percent of the total costs.  
It is worth noticing that all the previous items, together with a relatively small 
record of preventive expenditure (i.e. incurred from measures to protect 
environmental-related assets during the invasion and occupation of Kuwait) are all 
estimated through cost-based approaches. Only an item estimated through a 
production-based approach was calculated to assess the damage caused bay oil 
fires in the yield of several varieties of agricultural crops. 
 
Type of cost        
(calculation method) 
Damaged areas 
General / 
Unspecified 
Coastal / 
Marine 
Terrestr. 
Water 
resources 
Oil 
produc. 
areas 
Agricult. Health Built environ. 
Restoration costs 6804,0 480,2 4356,9 42,9 31,3 - 11,6 0,04 
Replacement cost 
(compensatory projects) 
- 5424,0 194,2 - - - - - 
Monitoring cost 247,1 - - - - - 0,3 - 
Production function based 
approach 
- - - - - 24,0 - - 
Preventive expenditure - 0,1 - 1,6 7,0  -  
Total costs   (USD Million) 
                    (percentage) 
7051,1 
40% 
5904,2 
33% 
4551,1 
26% 
44,5 
0,3% 
38,2 
0,2% 
24,0 
0,1% 
12,0 
0,1% 
0,04 
0,0002% 
 
 
 
 
 
This does not mean that the claimants rejected to use other methods than cost-
based approaches. Among the claims not recommended for compensation there 
are several using a production-based approach to elicit damage or depletion of 
terrestrial or aquatic resources. Such is the case of alleged losses in fish and 
shrimp catches, production of rangeland forage, forestry resources, medicinal 
plants, agricultural crops and livestock or sustainable yield of aquifers. However, 
these claims were not recommended for compensation due to insufficient 
evidence, either of damage or of causation. 
Interestingly enough, in two cases of proved damage, the compensation did not 
take place because of issues in the costing procedure. On the one hand, Kuwait 
sought compensation in the amount of USD 23 million for lost recreational 
opportunities due to (proved) damage in shoreline recreation. The claimed amount 
was estimated through a revealed preference approach (contingent valuation). 
The accuracy of this survey-based valuation technique was considered doubtful 
and the data was insufficient for a reliable estimation of the damage (United 
Table 6 Amount of claims from the Reports and Recommendations of the Panels of Commissioners 
according to type of costs and area of application of resources 
Source: Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Reports and Recommendations of the Panels of 
Commissioners (United Nations Security Council, 2001; United Nations Security Council, 2002; United Nations 
Security Council, 2003; United Nations Security Council, 2004a; United Nations Security Council, 2004b; United 
Nations Security Council, 2005; available at: www.uncc.ch) 
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Nations Security Council, 2005: 79-80). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia used 
scientific evidence to argue a severe impact to marine wildlife (birds, marine 
mammals and turtles) and the Panel considered that the some impact estimates 
were reasonable approximations to the actual loss. The Panel also agreed with 
the conceptual approach to compensate for the damage (a restocking 
programme). However, the costing of such claim (alleged in USD 127 million) was 
not properly developed and it was not recommended for compensation (United 
Nations Security Council, 2005:106-108). 
In this respect, an interesting debate arose within the context of whether or not 
temporary loss of natural resources without commercial value, i.e. not traded in 
the market, should be compensated. Iraq contended the lack of legal justification 
and precedents for the compensation of this kind of damages. It argued that such 
damages were not financially assessable and therefore outside the scope of 
international law. Meanwhile, the claimants pointed out that effects such as oil 
contamination or the loss of biomass in marine environment were ostensible 
examples of environmental damage. They also alleged that there international 
precedents of compensation for temporary losses stemming from pending 
remediation or restoration (using an example of indemnities in the Factory at 
Chorzów case, from the 1920s). Eventually, the panel considered that 
compensation for ‘pure environmental damage’ was not precluded, using as 
examples international conventions related with oil pollution damage (4, 6, and 11 
in Table 1) (United Nations Security Council, 2005: 16-19).. 
 
2.4 Final remarks 
Corporate liability is a relevant element in the discussions about the ecological 
debt. The concept of liability entails obligations in the context of the prevalent legal 
frameworks. Local interpretations and formulations of the liability concept are 
relevant to understand different ways to make it operative. As shown in the 
Section 2.1, the idea of liability is much narrower that the associated damages. 
Changes in the environment, either incidental or gradual, need to be related to 
identifiable sources in order to be the foundation for a liability. The response to the 
question on who is liable is answered at this stage. Then such changes have to be 
unquestionably associated to specific damages (income loss, cleanaup costs and 
so on) in order to steer a particular quantification approach.  
This modus operandi makes it difficult that the relevance of the damage can be 
expressed in all possible languages of valuation. Value systems that are absent in 
the current legal frameworks, or alternative rationalities that transcend the 
constraints of the ‘burden of proof’ may have little chance to find their way to court 
decisions or other legal proceedings. In this respect, the calculation of a liability is 
a value articulating institution (sensu Vatn, 2007) were some forms of value are 
accepted or dominant whereas some others are excluded. 
In particular, the determination of liabilities (in extra-judicial context) and their 
monetary quantification is a process of operationalising of a broader concept of 
responsibility. The case of losses resulting from Iraq’s invasion and occupation of 
Local interpretations 
and formulations of 
the liability concept 
are relevant to 
understand different 
ways to make it 
operative 
An interesting debate 
arose within the 
context of whether or 
not temporary loss of 
natural resources 
without commercial 
value, i.e. not traded 
in the market, should 
be compensated 
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Kuwait, explained above, offers an empirically rich case study to understand the 
type of costs (restoration, replacement, monitoring, loss of production) most 
commonly associated with environmental contingencies at the large scale. It also 
illustrates the type of valuation assessment typically accepted in cases of 
international claims. 
Making operative the concept of responsibility involves a great deal of monetary 
reductionism that necessarily excludes relevant aspects of the damage caused. 
The three examples presented in this chapter are different instances of this 
reductionism. Thus, the guidelines for prevention of pollution in the marine 
environment contained in different international conventions make a precision of 
what can be considered as a damage thus raising common technical boundaries 
that have not been there before. Moreover, punitive damages may be are explicitly 
set aside in those cases where general guidelines are set up with the purpose of 
preventing trials. Such is the case of the UK Compensation Scheme for Radiation-
linked Diseases. 
Still, it is clear that even a settlement gives a signal of a damage actually caused. 
In this respect, monetary valuation is not a metaphor. For those directly involved, 
the monetary compensation matters and has a real meaning in terms of their own 
claims and concerns. 
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The Niger Delta region comprises the largest river delta in Africa and the third 
largest in the world. The Delta contains 2,700 square miles of the continent’s 
remaining 3,500 square miles of mangrove, and it is believed that some 60 
percent of West Africa’s fish stocks breed in the rivers and swamps along its 
coast. The region is home to approximately 31 million inhabitants representing 40 
ethnic groups who speak some 250 different dialects. 
Besides this, sadly, the Niger Delta is also one of the most polluted areas in the 
world. It has been devastated by the exploitation of oil and gas since the 1950s. 
While the associated social and environmental consequences began prior to 
Nigeria’s independence, the situation did not improve when the country gained 
independence in 1960. Oil spills and uncontrolled flares have continued to occur 
and responses have remained inexistent, slow or inadequate. Since the 1970s, 
many grassroots movements of resistance have arisen, such as the emblematic 
struggle of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP). 
In this chapter, after giving some contextual information on the different 
stakeholders and the conflicts, we will briefly review the question of the corporate 
liabilities involved. What are the social and ecological costs? Is it possible to 
‘make up’ for them? How costly would it be? To that aim, we will discuss the 
nature of conflict in relation to the findings of a United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) study, the most systematic impact assessment undertaken to 
date (UNEP, 2011). 
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3.1 A note on the stakeholders 
The colonial government in Nigeria was originally set up by a private corporation, 
the British Royal Niger Company. The latter basically organized the administrative 
and military structure of the region in order to facilitate the exploitation of minerals 
and other raw materials. With petroleum replacing coal as the preeminent fuel of 
capitalism, new oil and gas exploitation resulted in joint ventures in which the state 
facilitated corporate control over communal land. Along the same line, the 
successive post-colonial governments of Nigeria have decreed a number of 
legislations, especially the Land Use Act and the Petroleum Act, which vest 
ownership and control of all land and mineral resources on the central 
government, regardless of local communities. The government can give away 
customary lands and forests to transnational companies for exploration and 
exploitation of crude oil and gas. These fossil fuels have been exploited 
essentially for export markets in Europe and North America, following the old 
colonial pattern. 
Oil exploration in the Delta commenced in the 1950s and extensive production 
facilities were established during the following decades up until today. These 
operations were handled by several companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, Total, 
Eni, ExxonMobil and Chevron. All of these companies have a significant stake in 
preserving a license to operate in Nigeria, and all have future plans for the region, 
especially offshore (DeSimone, 2012). They wield enormous political and 
economic power and often exert influence and control over the state. 
In contrast to the influence of oil companies, NGOs have limited political and 
economic power. That said, they are sometimes able to exert influence on the 
state and corporations by building social movements from below. For example, 
Friends of the Earth International and Greenpeace influenced Shell’s Brent Spar 
oil rig decommissioning and forced changes in the firms’ plans. In Nigeria, the 
EJO Environmental Rights Action (ERA), founded in 1993, pioneered 
environmental activism through advocacy campaigns that have resulted in some 
policy shifts by the government. 
In the Niger Delta’s traditional communities, land is the main source of livelihood. 
Prior to colonial imposition of the state, ownership and control of land was vested 
in the village community. It was in the interest of the community to protect the 
natural and social environment. However, the emergence of the state and its 
administrative structures had a huge impact on communities. The local means of 
government, communal life, and production were displaced. The state came to be 
identified as the facilitator of the plunder of natural resources, the destruction of 
livelihoods, and the violation of the rights of communities. 
 
3.2 The contested situation 
Oil was discovered in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in 1956. The Delta has 
since become a network of pipelines and oil infrastructure: 7000 km of pipelines, 
275 flow stations, 10 gas plants, 14 export terminals, 4 refineries, over 6000 oil 
The state came to be 
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plunder of natural 
resources, the 
destruction of 
livelihoods, and the 
violation of the rights 
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wells and 606 oil fields (Watts 2008). The region generates about 96% of all 
foreign earnings and 85% of state revenues. Between 1999 and 2009 only, 
Nigeria earned USD 200.34 billion and currently makes at least USD 1.5 billion 
every week from crude oil sales (ibid). However, the Delta region remains one of 
the poorest in Nigeria. Since the 1990s, it became an ‘ungovernable space’, 
particularly after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa. 
According to a recent study, the situation led to an era of building social 
mobilisations (1970–1987), and a corresponding awareness that led to 
disenchantment and peaceful protests (1988–1998), and the subsequent armed 
rebellion against the state and the oil companies (1999–today) (Ojo, 2012). This 
categorization may vary from place to place, sometimes running concomitantly. 
The struggle for economic, social and environmental justice and resistance to oil 
exploitation has thus employed both non-violent and violent means according to 
the contexts and the response of the state. The various stages and forms of the 
struggle also reflect changing demands: from compensation and environmental 
restitution to self-determination, resource control, and the emerging concept of 
‘leave oil in the soil’. Yet, although both strategies and tactics of non-violence and 
violence distance themselves from one another, they have also somehow 
complemented each other by building a critical mass for socio-environmental 
justice. 
Above all, it is the nature of violence against the communities and the destruction 
of their livelihood that have fostered resentment and which has in turn shaped 
forms of mobilisation and resistance. Protest by individual communities against 
the oil companies, which had been a feature of oil exploitation in the Niger Delta, 
experienced a turning point in 1990. What was a peaceful protest by community 
members against Shell, and demand for basic amenities, turned deadly as Shell 
and the government invited the paramilitary police and army to shoot and kill 
dozens of community members at the same time that the whole community was 
razed down by agents of the state. 
Soon after, the ‘Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People’ (MOSOP), under 
the leadership of Ken Saro Wiwa, was established. In a short period, the 
movement gained community-wide acceptance to confront the state and issue 
notice to Shell to quit Nigeria. While Shell obtained from Ogoniland about USD 5.2 
billion between 1958 and 1993, the Ogonis themselves still lacked basic social 
amenities such as piped water, electricity, and adequate medical care. Moreover, 
fishing and subsistence farming decreased due to soil and water contamination. 
In 1992, the MOSOP issued a memorandum addressed to the Nigerian state and 
Shell with a 30-day ultimatum to Shell and the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation to pay back rents and royalties, environmental remediation and 
compensation or quit forthwith. They called for the control of the oil revenue and 
the mitigation of impacts as priorities. The memorandum, as part of the Ogoni Bill 
of Rights (MOSOP, 1992), demanded the following: (1) payment of USD 6 billion 
unpaid royalties; (2) payment of USD 4 billion as reparation for damages and 
compensation for the environmental pollution suffered by the people and their 
environment; (3) immediate stoppage of environmental devastation; (4) burying of 
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all high pressure pipelines currently exposed; and (5) dialogue between 
representatives of the community, Shell and the Federal Government. 
The Ogonis then followed the proclamation with daily peaceful mass protests 
against Shell and the government. But the oil companies refused to move. The 
MOSOP continued the mobilization and internationalised the campaign. On 4 
January 1993, as the United Nations marked World Indigenous Populations day, 
an estimated 300,000 Ogoni, including women and children, staged a historic non-
violent protest and marched against Shell’s ‘ecological wars’. As a response, 
frequent government reprisal attacks and human rights violations resulted in the 
death of hundreds of Ogonis, including the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, following 
which Shell had no option but to end its oil extraction in Ogoni. On a global scale, 
these mobilisations represent perhaps the most formidable grassroots resistance 
to corporate oil operations. 
Community awareness was enhanced throughout the Niger Delta and many 
similar protest activities occurred in the region. They were peaceful in nature 
although pockets of oil facility sabotage were becoming increasingly evident. The 
EJO ERA was founded in 1993 with Nnimmo Bassey as the group’s Executive 
Director and Chair of Friends of the Earth International. ERA has been at the 
forefront of the fight for the peaceful resolution of the Niger Delta crisis, deploying 
the twofold objective of combining environmental with development issues, 
especially through the promotion of community self-reliance. Together with Acción 
Ecológica and the Oilwatch network, ERA led the demand for a 10-year oil 
moratorium on new oil discoveries and licensing. In brief, the key objectives of the 
‘leave oil in the soil’ proposal was to halt activities related to oil discoveries and 
mining in order to pave the way to a transition from a fossil fuel-based economy to 
a post-petroleum Nigeria (ERA/FoEN 2009; see also Ojo, 2010). Other objectives 
included: (1) refocus Nigeria on productive engagement rather than depending 
and being trapped by one product; (2) wealth redistribution; (3) creation of more 
jobs through economic diversification; and (4) restoration of the despoiled Niger 
Delta environment and execution of needed development. 
In parallel, violence also increased. From 1999 onwards, the region was marked 
with the daily news of kidnapping of oil workers for ransom, and the sabotage of 
crude oil pipelines and facilities that eventually reduced oil production in Nigeria to 
two-thirds (Watts, 2007). The struggle was exemplified by the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a secretive and multifaceted guerrilla-
type movement, well-organized and well-armed, that declared a hidden war 
against the government and oil companies. The explicit aim of MEND is to destroy 
the capacity of the rentier state to produce crude, its lifeblood. By early 2006, 
kidnapping of oil workers assumed a frightening dimension. The MEND derives its 
huge membership mainly from unemployed young men and women in the Ijaw-
speaking areas of the Delta. These incidents contribute to increasing the price of 
oil in the world market. 
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3.3 Impact assessment and valuation4 
In order to estimate the social and environmental liabilities of oil companies in the 
Niger Delta, data on oil spills must be found. Unsurprisingly, these data vary 
widely depending on the sources and have been hotly contested by the different 
stakeholders. Existing sources include (DeSimone, 2012): 
 The Nigerian government, which has released its own figures periodically, 
mostly focusing on coastal and adjacent wetland areas. 
 Shell’s subsidiary in Nigeria, SPDC, has been releasing data for the last 15 
years. It is the only company to do so but it still leaves unknown the 
amounts it spilled before this period and during its peak years of production 
in Ogoniland, as well as estimates for remaining cleanup, remediation, 
compensation and other potential liabilities. 
 Local community members, through testimony, press interviews and public 
statements, have shed light on the nature and scope of the damage. For 
example, fisherman, farmers and local businesses have had to shut down 
or move as a result of spills, and many communities have suffered 
devastating consequences from losing access to potable drinking water, 
crops and livelihoods. 
 Multilateral institutions and civil society organizations, with the help of local 
community groups, have generated estimates of their own. In 2009, the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) undertook a two-year 
assessment of the environmental impacts of oil spills in Ogoniland, the 
results of which were released in August 2011 after months of delays 
(UNEP, 2011). It is the best accounting to date of the spills’ scope and 
damage, although it only covers Ogoniland and does not review spills 
elsewhere in the Niger Delta. In the rest of the section, we shall summarize 
their findings. 
The much anticipated UNEP environmental assessment of Ogoniland was carried 
out under tremendous pressure from various stakeholders with divergent interests. 
Although the study was funded by oil companies, UNEP was somehow able to 
maintain a level of independence. To preserve impartiality, it conducted the study 
within a “negotiated” framework for cooperation, “in which all parties were involved 
and a recognized team of national and international experts then recruited”. The 
team of experts spent 14 months examining more than 200 locations and 122 km 
of pipeline, in addition to reviewing more than 5,000 medical records and 
engaging more than 23,000 people at local community meetings. The UNEP team 
also took and analyzed more than 4,000 oil samples from 142 groundwater 
monitoring wells. It is the nature and scope of this original, independent research 
that makes UNEP’s report the most comprehensive to date and will prove a useful 
baseline from which to measure progress going forward. 
 
 
4
    This section draws extensively on UNEP (2011) and DeSimone (2012). 
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UNEP found “that there are, in a significant number of locations, serious threats to 
human health from contaminated drinking water to concerns over the viability and 
productivity of ecosystems”. This is despite the fact that the oil industry is largely 
no longer actively drilling in Ogoniland. However, what did shock UNEP 
researchers was “that pollution has perhaps gone further and penetrated deeper 
than many may have previously supposed”. As UNEP explains, this is attributable 
to several factors: high rainfall rates in the region, slow clean-up response times, 
fragile ecosystems, and the lack of a clay layer beneath topsoil throughout the 
region. UNEP explains that Ogoniland’s high rainfall rates thwarts clean-up efforts, 
especially if they are delayed, because it very quickly disperses oil slicks and 
regularly embeds oil deep into the ecosystem, even quickly seeping into the root 
zones of many plant species causing plant stress and destruction. “Oil pollution in 
many intertidal creeks has left mangroves denuded of leaves and stems”, UNEP 
observed, “leaving roots coated in a bitumen-like substance sometimes one 
centimeter or more thick”. UNEP also notes that fires resulting from oil spilled on 
land kill vegetation and leave a crust over the land, making remediation difficult. 
Overall, UNEP found Ogoniland’s wetlands “highly degraded” and in need of 
rehabilitation. For example, UNEP reported that in Bodo West, artisanal refining 
activities and related spills between 2007 and 2011 have been accompanied by a 
10 per cent loss of healthy mangrove cover and raise the threat of “irreversible 
loss of mangrove habitat in this area”. 
Top concerns UNEP highlighted in its 2011 report are problems with groundwater 
contamination, air pollution, fisheries and crops. 
 Groundwater contamination: Further worsening the situation is the lack of a 
continuous clay layer across Ogoniland and surrounding areas, which 
means groundwater in Ogoniland and beyond is quickly exposed to 
hydrocarbons spilled on the surface. “In 49 cases, UNEP observed 
hydrocarbons in soil at depths of at least 5 meters”, it says, which “has 
major implications for the type of remediation required”. UNEP found, at 
two-thirds of the contaminated land sites (41 locations) from which it took 
samples, the soil contamination exceeds the requirements outlined in the 
government’s Standards for the Petroleum Industries in Nigeria (EGASPIN). 
The spill situation and years of neglect, UNEP finds, has left the Ogoni 
community exposed to hydrocarbons in outdoor air and drinking water, 
sometimes at elevated concentrations, as well as through dermal contact 
with contaminated soil, sediments and surface water. UNEP notes that 
many Ogonis have been exposed to hydrocarbons for more than 50 years. 
UNEP researchers found hydrocarbon contamination at 28 wells at 10 
communities adjacent to contaminated sites. At seven wells, it says, 
samples were at least 1,000 times higher than the Nigerian drinking water 
standard of 3 micrograms per litre. In interviews with members of these 
local communities, UNEP observers found that the locals were aware of the 
dangers of the oil pollution but said that “they continue to use the water for 
drinking, bathing, washing and cooking as they have no alternative”. The 
most serious case of groundwater contamination is at Nisisioken Ogale, in 
Eleme local government area, UNEP says, close to a Nigerian National 
UNEP found “that 
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Petroleum Company product pipeline where an eight-centimetre layer of 
refined oil was observed floating on the groundwater serving community 
wells. Local residents there are drinking water from wells that is 
contaminated with benzene, a known carcinogen, at levels more than 900 
times above the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline. The report 
states that this contamination warrants emergency action ahead of all other 
remediation efforts. 
 Air pollution: UNEP also detected benzene in air samples at concentrations 
ranging from 0.155 to 48.2 micrograms per cubic meter. While finding 
benzene in air samples is common in any community using fossil fuels, 
about 10 percent of the benzene concentrations in Ogoniland were higher 
than the concentrations WHO and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) say correspond to a one in 10,000 incidence of cancer. 
 Fish: As mentioned earlier, mangroves in wetlands have been suffering 
from hydrocarbon pollution, and these areas also serve as spawning 
grounds for fish and nurseries for young fish. The pollution, UNEP says, has 
had a severe, detrimental effect on local fish populations’ life cycles and on 
the communities relying on these fish stocks for sustenance and livelihoods. 
In addition to hydrocarbon pollution, dredging that has occurred in the area 
has left spaces where invasive species, such as nipa palm, that also tend to 
be more resistant to oil pollution, are thriving in place of mangroves. This 
has prompted calls for rehabilitation of these waterways and wetlands. 
Another side effect of the pollution is that fish populations have left polluted 
areas, leading fisherman to migrate further upstream or downstream away 
from their communities to survive. While UNEP found no immediate 
concerns for human health resulting from consuming fish exposed to 
hydrocarbons, it did find the local fisheries decimated by hydrocarbon 
pollution. Fish farming enterprises set up to augment populations, which 
themselves have become infiltrated by oil spills, also have been lost to 
pollution. 
 Crops: Like the mangroves and local fish stocks, crops too have suffered 
from spill damage. Root crops such as cassava, widely planted in 
Ogoniland, become quickly damaged and rendered unusable after 
exposure to oil spills. Even in areas where some remediation has taken 
place, UNEP says, plants generally showed signs of stress and yields were 
reportedly lower than in non-impacted areas. 
In short, the report confirms Shell’s decades of socio-environmental atrocities that 
will take about 25 to 30 years to recover if urgent steps are taken including the 
establishment of an initial USD 1 billion Clean Up Fund. Despite the challenges, 
UNEP envisages the possibility of meaningful environmental restoration of 
Ogoniland. According to the report, the companies have an obligation to rectify the 
damage along the “polluter pays” principle. It sets eight priorities as emergency 
measures dealing with drinking water. 
The report confirms 
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UNEP urges the Nigerian government to create an Ogoniland Environmental 
Restoration Authority to oversee implementation of UNEP’s recommendations and 
a ‘centre for excellence’ to promote sharing good practices. It too suggests a fixed 
initial lifespan of a decade for the authority and a dedicated budget drawn from a 
new Restoration Fund capitalized through an initial cash injection of USD 1 billion 
from the oil industry and Nigerian government (see Table 7). UNEP underscores 
that its USD 1 billion budget for the fund is an initial estimate and only covers the 
first five years of remediation efforts. This does not include funds to compensate 
local inhabitants for lost livelihoods, ill health effects or other negative 
consequences from the years of oil spills and resulting environmental degradation. 
 
Item Cost  (USD) 
E mergency measures (80% for providing alternative drinking water to communities 
with contaminated water supply) 
63,750,000 
Clean-up of land contamination 611,466,100 
Clean-up of benzene and MTBE contamination in Nsisioken Ogale 50,000,000 
Clean-up of sediments 20,000,000 
Restoration of artisanal refining sites 99,452,700 
Mangrove restoration and rehabilitation 25,500,000 
Surveillance and monitoring 21,468,000 
Ogoniland restoration authority operating expenses 44,000,000 
Center for excellence in restoration 18,600,000 
Alternative employment initiative for those engaged in artisanal refining 10,000,000 
Third-party verification and international expert support 48,211,840 
Total 1,012,448,640 
 
The report’s own estimates of USD 1 billion in clean-up and remediation costs for 
five years of a 25 to 30 year effort in Ogoniland alone, which represents only 14 
percent of the total surface area of the Niger Delta, points to liabilities for the entire 
delta up to more than USD 42 billion, if the initial USD 1 billion is extrapolated for 
the total land area and multiplied by six to cover equal investments over a 30-year 
time period. 
DeSimone (2012: 32) wrote that “much of the information needed to offer a clear 
and precise assessment of the implications for companies and their shareholders 
of the long-term costs of operating in the Niger Delta is unavailable or 
undisclosed. Nevertheless a picture is emerging of clear potential liabilities of 
companies with former and present operations there”. These include: 
 Continuing needs to assess spill damage, including funding for 
environmental surveys and development of remediation plans. 
 Funds to conduct clean-up operations. 
Table 7: 
UNEP’s initial cost 
estimate for the first 
five years of 
restoration in 
Ogoniland  
(UNEP, 2011). 
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 Following up with efforts to remediate environmental damage resulting from 
the spills, including much-needed work to restore mangroves and wetlands. 
 Costs to monitor and attend to health issues related to local community 
members’ long-term exposure to hydrocarbons, especially in groundwater. 
 Paying awards to community members to compensate for lost livelihoods 
related to depleted fish populations and destruction of arable land, as well 
as for adverse health effects associated with the spills. 
 Fines from regulatory authorities. 
 Legal, public relations and management costs associated with settling 
cases associated with the spills. 
Table 8 summarizes each company’s global revenue, net income, global oil and 
gas production, Nigeria spill volume, and potential liabilities in Nigeria based on 
DeSimone (2012). Liability estimates are presented in ranges and only assess 
potential cleanup, remediation and compensation costs, not additional legal 
liabilities tied to punitive damages. The estimates take into account that these top 
companies also are not culpable or responsible for all of the spills, albeit the vast 
majority of them. The estimates take into account each company’s production 
volume, location of operations, history of doing business in Nigeria, spill reports 
and pending lawsuits. DeSimone’s numbers are likely to be well below the reality. 
 
 Shell ExxonMobil Total Chevron Eni 
Drilling in Nigeria since (year) 1936 1955 1962 1963 1962 
Revenues in 2011 (USD) 
470.2 
billion 
467.0 billion 
166.6 
billion 
244.4 
billion 
110.5 
billion 
Net income in 2011 (USD) 
31.2 
billion 
42.2 billion 
12.3 
billion 
26.9 
billion 
7.8 billion 
Global production (barrels of oil 
equivalent/day) 
1.173 
million 
4.506 
million 
2.346 
million 
2.673 
million 
1.523 
million 
Oil and gas production in Nigeria 
(barrels of oil equivalent/day) 
384,000 350,000 287,000 260,000 154,000 
‘Official’ oil spill volume in 
Nigeria (barrels) 
21,000 ND ND ND ND 
Potential liabilities in Nigeria 
(USD) 
4-13 
billion 
3-7 billion 
2-5 
billion 
2-6 
billion 
1-3 
billion 
% of net income 13-42% 7-17% 16-41% 7-22% 13-38% 
 
3.4 Final remarks on this case 
In this chapter, we have described the huge social and environmental impacts of 
oil production in the Niger Delta as well as the resistance movements it generated. 
In order to have a better idea of the liabilities involved, we also reviewed the 
results of the most systematic impact assessment carried out to date (UNEP, 
2011). These results confirm Shell’s decades of environmental atrocities that will 
take about 25-30 years to recover if urgent steps are taken, including the 
Table 8 
Company data and 
liability estimates 
 Source: DeSimone (2012). 
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establishment of an initial USD 1 billion Clean Up Fund. Unfortunately this UNEP 
study only covers 14 percent of the total delta area. A lot of uncertainties remain. 
But what is certain is that the cleanup, remediation and compensation costs will be 
considerable. Only a strong social movement, along with national and international 
legal actions, will force oil companies to take their responsibilities. 
Most calculations available have estimated the cost of remediation and few so far 
have attempted to address compensation costs involved. In fact, it is virtually 
impossible to ‘calculate’ a convincing monetary compensation. And if carried out 
and enforced, such colossal compensatory amounts of money could be used to 
address the stark poverty and underdevelopment but could most certainly create 
additional problems and conflicts if effective distributive system is not put in place. 
In the future, instead of being monetarily individualized, compensation should 
mainly take the form of meaningful plans aimed at community self-reliance in the 
provision of some needed infrastructure such as health facilities, schools, agro-
ecological developments, alternative energy sources, socio-cultural reinforcement, 
and job opportunities. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The region of the Yasuní National Park, in eastern Ecuador, is the theatre of an 
historical socio-environmental conflict. While this park protects the most biodiverse 
rainforest on earth as well as indigenous populations, beneath its surface lies 
about 850 million barrels of oil located in three oilfields – Ishpingo, Tambococha 
and Tiputini, or ITT for short. This represents 20% of Ecuador’s total oil reserves. 
Oil has been the backbone of Ecuador’s national development since 1972 and it 
accounts for 60 percent of export earnings. But rather than exploiting the oil, the 
Rafael Correa government launched in 2007 a potentially path-breaking 
alternative: to leave the oil indefinitely underground and to seek instead monetary 
compensation from the international community (and especially from the countries 
historically most responsible for global warming) to the tune of USD 3.6 billion 
over 10 years, roughly half the market value of the non-extracted oil. The money 
raised would be invested in renewable energy projects, helping Ecuador reduce its 
dependency on oil, as well as in environmental and community projects 
nationwide (McAvoy, 2011; Martínez, 2012). 
The Yasuní-ITT proposal offered a new model that shifts the debate away from 
‘carbon offsetting’ and ‘mitigation’ towards something far more tangible: to stop 
emissions in the first place. Interestingly, the problem of valuation holds a key 
position in the debates (García Dos Santos, 2007). Rafael Correa himself said in 
front of the UN assembly in New York that  
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“…the Ecuadorian proposal seeks to transform the old conceptions of the 
economy and the concept of value. In the market system, the only 
possible value is the exchange value, the price. The Yasuní-ITT project is 
above all based on the recognition of the values of use and service, of the 
non-chrematistic values of environmental safety and maintenance of 
global diversity” (September 24th, 2007) 
In his view, however, a ‘fair’ monetary compensation was the central element 
ensuring the viability of the entire initiative. The fact that the amount collected was 
much below the expectations was used as the excuse to sea aside the whole 
proposal. For the EJO Acción Ecológica, on the other hand, the oil should be kept 
in the ground even without an international contribution, because human rights 
and Nature’s conservation cannot be monetarily compensated. The Yasuní 
initiative can thus be regarded as a battle ground over the importance of monetary 
valuation between, on one hand, the government and the oil companies (for 
different reasons), and on the other hand, EJOs and indigenous populations 
defending human rights and the rights of Nature. In this chapter, after a brief 
exposition of the conflict at stake, we will summarize the limits of some valuation 
methods that have been applied to the Yasuní-ITT proposal. 
 
4.2 The contested situation: some history5 
Before Shell’s exploration in the early part of the 20th century and the 1941 war 
with Peru, there was no strong nationalist attachment to the Yasuní. The Yasuní 
was no more than one of these ‘empty lands’ belonging to the state, awaiting 
some kind of ‘mise en valeur’. In 1979, the government created the Yasuní 
National Park with a surface of 1,476,000 hectares. Ten years later, the UNESCO 
granted the park the title of ‘biosphere reserve for humanity’. 
The battle for the preservation of the Yasuní started in 1986 when three 
exploration blocks were carved within the park (Blocks 14, 16, and 17), a decision 
that indicated the government’s intention to give priority to oil extraction over 
environmental conservation. Ecuadorian environmental NGOs responded by 
forming a common front, the CORDAVI (Corporación de Defensa de la Vida), 
which brought to the constitutional court a case against different bodies of the 
state. The tribunal decided to reject the petition and the park’s surface was 
reduced to 982,000 hectares. This did not put an end to the dispute. 
Ecuadorian environmental NGOs became divided in two wings, those who, like 
Acción Ecológica, maintained a strong and uncompromising position against oil 
drilling, and those for whom accommodation between corporate oil, state and civil 
society had to be found. The latter flourished during the late 1990s and throughout 
the 2000s when international funding flowed generously to collaborative projects 
aimed at integrating oil development, indigenous rights and biodiversity 
conservation, as well as to organizations supporting conflict resolution and social 
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corporate responsibility (Rival, 2011). However, again, conflicts were still present, 
as some indigenous communities continued to oppose any oil extraction. Conflicts 
and mobilisations surged once more in 1994, when Ecuadorian, European and 
North American environmental NGOs came together with indigenous 
organizations under the banner ‘Amazon for life’ to fight against the government’s 
seventh invitation to tender for new oil concessions in the Amazon. 
Also, in 1993, over 30,000 Ecuadorians filed a lawsuit against the oil giant Texaco, 
now owned by Chevron, claiming that outdated techniques led to the dumping of 
18 billion gallons of toxic waste directly into streams, rivers and the jungle floor, 
poisoning their land and water. The case – the biggest environmental lawsuit in 
the world – raged for over 17 years until in February 2011 Chevron/Texaco was 
found guilty and was ordered to pay damages of USD 18 billion for pollution 
(confirmed a year later, on appeal). 
 
In the Yasuní region, a conflictive relationship between indigenous communities 
and oil companies has been predominant. Waorani people, for example, claim use 
rights to the whole of the Yasuní, while trying to articulate their own view of 
territoriality and good life in a changing world where cash income has become a 
necessity (Rival, 2002; 2011). When Petrobras won the right to operate Block 31, 
the Waorani organized various local and regional protests culminating with a 
march to Quito in 2005. They demanded the company’s expulsion from their 
Map 3 
Ecuador’s oil blocks 
 Source: Finer et al., 2008). 
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territory as well as a full ban on oil development in the Yasuní. Despite mounting 
protests, Petrobras’ environmental licence was not fully revoked but simply 
suspended on the grounds of irregularities, before being finally granted in 2007. 
The convergence of indigenous rights and environmental protection is also well 
illustrated by the fate of Block 17 and the creation of an ‘intangible’ territory within 
the Yasuní National Park for indigenous communities living in voluntary isolation 
such as the Tagaeri and Taromenane. Whereas environmental and human rights 
activists campaigned for natural boundaries such as rivers, the oil companies 
whose blocks partly overlapped with the zona intangible did everything in their 
power to ensure minimal encroachment to their concessions. The boundaries of 
the zona were finally agreed upon in 2007. Unfortunately, the zona offers, in 
practice, only minimal protection. It cannot prevent incursions by loggers and other 
illegal economic actors. 
This entire context, plus the debates on climate change, led Acción Ecológica to 
propose a new initiative in 1997, namely to “leave oil in the ground” in areas of 
high biological value and threatened indigenous populations. The initiative 
continued as a collaboration between radical ecologists imagining a ‘post-oil 
society’ (for instance, Esperanza Martínez of Acción Ecológica) and government 
officials convinced that ecosystems goods and services need to be considered in 
economic decisions (such as Alberto Acosta and Fander Falconí). This new form 
of collaboration is far from being free from tension. But with the election of Rafael 
Correa in 2007, several of these academics and environmentalists became part of 
the government and it was Acosta who presented the ITT proposal the same year. 
In 2009, Germany was set to contribute USD 70 million a year and there was 
interest from several other European countries. The UNDP had accepted to 
become independent administrators of the trust fund and the agreement was 
finally signed in 2011. However, until today (April 2013), the total collected so far 
is not as high as expected. The contradictory signals and discourses of the 
government, the financial crisis, and budgetary austerity have not been helpful. 
The rich countries probably also fear that other countries may ask for similar deals 
or that they will not benefit from any return for instance in the form of carbon 
credits. Ecuador has thus turned to the businesses like Coca Cola for funding, 
which is far from unproblematic. 
But Correa’s government could take an even more counterproductive path if it 
chooses carbon market mechanisms. Carbon credits issued in exchange for 
financial donations would be used to offset the greenhouse gas emissions of rich 
countries and big companies. “The original initiative was a critique of carbon 
markets,” says Esperanza Martínez (quoted in McAvoy, 2011). “It was saying that 
Kyoto wasn’t working, that Kyoto was created precisely not to affect the oil 
markets, so that industrialized countries could continue polluting”. Unlike Kyoto’s 
CDMs, the Yasuní initiative directly threatens the world’s oil supply. If the model is 
rolled out to other countries, it would push us faster along the road to oil shortages 
and price hikes – but also to genuinely reducing CO2 emissions. 
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In April 2013, President Correa, on the eve of his second term, came back with 
the setting of a time period for the initiative to be “evaluated”. In October 2013 he 
finally announced the abandonment of the plan, which sparked generalised 
national and international criticisms and social protest in Ecuador. 
 
4.3 The stakeholders and their ‘value systems’ 
4.3.1 Nature 
The environmental case for leaving the ITT oil fields untapped is beyond question. 
A single hectare of rainforest within Yasuní has been found to contain over 650 
different species of tree – more than the whole of the US and Canada combined – 
and the Park boasts over 600 types of birds. Research stations have documented 
world records for ‘species richness’ of amphibians, reptiles and bats (see Map 4). 
In light of this incredible ‘megadiversity’, oil exploitation would be disastrous. 
Numerous studies have shown that these operations have not brought any 
development. They have caused instead considerable social and environmental 
damages in the areas of exploitation such as soil and water contamination. In 
addition, the roads built into the Amazon bring uncontrolled immigration, loss of 
biodiversity and deforestation. 
 
 
 
Map 4  
The Yasuní National Park is at 
the intersection of amphibians, 
mammals, birds and plant peak 
diversity areas. 
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4.3.2 Indigenous populations and smallholder campesinos 
The entire National Park region is also the ancestral land of the indigenous 
Waorani people who are now largely settled in 38 communities. There are also at 
least two tribes related to the Waorani, the Tagaeri and Taromenane, who remain 
in voluntary isolation. Some of the most dramatic impacts of oil exploitation have 
been seen amongst the indigenous Waorani people. Evangelical missionaries 
made the first contact with them in the 1950s. Oil companies followed in their 
wake, negotiating with individual leaders to drill in return for cash, roads, free food 
and alcohol that, combined, rapidly undermined their culture. The other local 
communities are mainly either indigenous Kichwa or subsistence-oriented 
smallholders. Both groups migrated to the area with the opening of the roads and 
both are dependent on a flourishing rainforest with clean rivers, animals to hunt 
and land to grow crops. Leaving the ITT oil untapped is critical for their survival. 
In March 2013, two elderly Waorani died following an attack by voluntarily isolated 
Taromenane. This situation of siege on behalf of oil companies leads the people in 
voluntary isolation to the edge of extinction. Because of this, the proposal to leave 
oil in the ground is imperative. 
4.3.3 Oil companies 
Oil companies are very influential in Ecuador. They can often win out, regardless 
of National Park protection, indigenous reserves or UNESCO titles. Oil is key to 
Ecuador’s economy and for the Correa government an indispensable source of 
funding for social programmes and public investments (in 2008, oil revenues 
accounted for half of the general budget). For some Ecuadorians, it is sometimes 
the only source of employment. Oil makes Ecuador heavily dependent on foreign 
companies (which control more than 40 percent of its oil extraction) and on the US 
market (see Rival, 2011, for a brief history of the oil sector in the Ecuador). 
4.3.4 The government 
The government was always been ambiguous or with a double discourse. While 
some of the biggest advances in environmental legislation have taken place under 
Rafael Correa, it was never clear how supportive of the proposal he truly was. 
Ecuador’s new Constitution, signed in 2008, is the world’s only constitution that 
recognizes the Rights of Nature. However, according to Esperanza Martínez, the 
‘deep green’ Constitution that emerged was largely a result of key figures such as 
Alberto Acosta within the government, rather than Correa himself (McAvoy, 2011). 
Notably, many have since then quit the government, Acosta included. “It’s clear 
that the President doesn’t like the Constitution he’s agreed to”, says Martínez 
(ibid.), “and issues of environmentalism even less, but he’s trapped because it has 
given him praise and worldwide attention”. 
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oil exploitation have 
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the indigenous 
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Some of the main actors Associated values/features 
Nature 
 entitled with rights in Ecuador 
 home to exceptionally rich biodiversity 
 reservoir of fresh water 
 climate regulation 
 universal dimension 
Indigenous populations 
 sociocultural maintenance 
 territorial and other collective rights 
 healthy territories necessary for their livelihood 
 right to life 
EJOs (such as Acción Ecológica) 
 contribution to stop climate change 
 biodiversity and fresh water protection 
 indigenous people rights 
 move to a post-oil economy 
Oil companies (management) 
 entrepreneurial freedom 
 profitability 
Current government 
 ambiguous mix of all the previous values but emphasis 
oneconomic growth 
 
4.4 Valuation methods 
The conflictive situation in the Yasuní has all the attributes of a multicriteria 
problem. This is so because such extractive activities are at the same time a huge 
source of revenue, usually for a tiny minority of powerful people, as well as a 
considerable source of environmental contamination and health damages, 
especially on the populations living nearby exploitation sites. In this situation, is oil 
exploitation worth its costs at the local, national and international levels? 
Larrea (2007: 29) summarized as follow the main results of the standard cost-
benefit analyses that have been carried out for the Yasuní-ITT initiative: 
“The externalities studied, which represent only part of the total, reach 
USD 1.247 billion and the costs of the CO2 emissions from ITT oil would 
equate to 375 million tons – equivalent to at least USD 1.684 billion. [...] 
We may conclude, therefore, that the option of keeping ITT oil 
underground would benefit the international community by reducing 
climate change, preserving biodiversity and supporting the subsistence of 
indigenous cultures – all at a lower cost than the damage the oil extraction 
would produce on a planetary scale. Ecuador would also benefit by 
obtaining compensation capital, whose interest would permit a sustainable 
future to be built.” 
Such results – although in favour of the initiative – leave us with dissatisfied. Can 
all the damages be monetarily evaluated? What about the incommensurability of 
values? (Martínez-Alier et al., 1998).As an alternative, a multicriteria evaluation 
(MCE) seems better equipped to grasp the multidimensional nature of the problem 
at stake. Indeed, MCEs allow comparing scenarios along several dimensions and 
criteria (not only monetary). With the largest participation possible, they can 
become a social learning process for the stakeholders involved (see Gerber et al., 
2013). 
Table 9  
Some major 
values/features 
associated with 
stakeholders involved 
in the Yasuní-ITT 
initiative 
Source: Own elaboration 
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Very briefly, in order to structure the multicriteria problem, three fundamental 
categories of information must be defined: (1) the scenarios considered, (2) the 
stakeholders involved, and (3) the dimensions, criteria and indicators used for the 
evaluation. These three categories are not only ‘technical’ questions. They are 
also deeply political, but this doesn’t mean they cannot be defined on a 
reasonable and common basis. This phase is obviously delicate and key to 
everything else (Gerber et al. 2013). A recent study has applied a multicriteria 
software to the Yasuní situation (Vallejo et al., 2011). We will briefly review it here, 
as well as some critical points made by Oilwatch. 
Vallejo et al. (2011) carried out a Social Multicriteria Evaluation using the software 
NAIADE (Munda, 2008). They defined two basic scenarios. The first one – ‘Plan A’ 
– follows the Yasuní-ITT proposal ‘leaves oil in the ground’ based on the initial 
2007 project. This scenario entails, among other, the respect of indigenous 
territories, the protection of biodiversity, the development of the eco-touristic 
sector, and less CO2 emissions globally. The authors also analyse variants of this 
scenario, with less optimistic indicators. The second scenario – ‘Plan B’ – is 
centred on the extraction of oil in the Yasuní (except the Ishpingo sector). Also, 
the authors added a variant with a larger area of exploitation. The Plan B scenario 
is based on three assumptions: that the corresponding revenue made by the state 
will be redistributed (e.g. in the form of social programs), that there will be social 
and environmental costs even with the most modern extractive technologies, and 
that this scenario will foster the economic growth of the related oil-dependent 
industrial sector. These assumptions are quite favourable to the extraction 
scenario because the authors’ intention was to compare the Yasuní-ITT proposal 
with the “best possible” conditions for oil extraction. 
These scenarios were evaluated by using a number of indicators that could be 
gathered into seven evaluation dimensions that formed the multicriteria matrix: (1) 
local economy (direct income of each alternative, tax revenues from oil revenues 
by the state, indirect revenues associated with each alternative); (2) “health” of the 
national economy (economic growth, diversification of production, vulnerability of 
the economy on the long term); (3) environmental dimension (biodiversity, 
pollution due to oil, deforestation, induced or avoided CO2 emissions); (4) social 
dimension (the opportunity of direct and indirect jobs generation, investment in 
social development); (5) cultural dimension (effects on culture, effects on the 
population’s living conditions, potential environmental conflicts, capacity for social 
participation, opportunities for self-determination); (6) governance and social 
cohesion (breaches in physical conditions between groups in the population, 
institutional mechanisms for inclusion or exclusion, sense of belonging to society 
and to the groups that integrate it); and (7) international relations (the country’s 
international position in the negotiations on climate change and biodiversity 
conservation, the country’s influence in the regional integration process). In brief, 
the authors then elaborated an impact matrix and ran the NAIADE software along 
the three standard steps, namely comparison of pairs of alternatives, aggregation 
of all criteria, and then ordering of the alternatives. In short, their MCE gave a 
clear result in favour of plan A as long as at least 50 percent of the requested 
compensation is obtained. 
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Acción Ecológica and Oilwatch criticized this study, based on a number of points: 
 Oilwatch contests the “Plan A” scenario which is built on a strong pro-
market basis. Indeed, this scenario promotes financial mechanisms that 
Oilwatch rejects, namely carbon trading, REDD-type projects, the promotion 
of “eco-industries”, the sale of environmental services and Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). These instruments, to remain brief, are 
seen as harmful ways of green-washing global capitalism: “These carbon 
market-related projects are used in many parts of the world – including 
Ecuador – to justify and expand extractive activities, energy mega projects 
and other plans that entail deforestation and loss of biodiversity, as well as 
being used to neutralize resistance” (Oilwatch, 2012). 
 Oilwatch contests the criteria and indicators used, seen as too narrow and 
unable to shed proper light on the problem. Within the “sustainable 
economy” dimension, for example, Oilwatch (2012) argues that “The 
indicators are similar to those used in any cost/benefit analysis, such as 
economic growth [...]; productive diversification [...]; and the vulnerability of 
the economy [...]. A sustainable economy should be based on sovereignty: 
economic sovereignty, food sovereignty, energy sovereignty, etc.” 
 Oilwatch rejects the strategic usefulness of a MCE at this particular moment 
of the struggle. The Yasuní-ITT initiative is indeed still very fragile and 
Oilwatch favours the strategy of “scandalisation” and increased pressure, 
instead of acknowledging a MCE that doesn’t take other views into account 
but promotes “green” financial approaches. “Th[is] MCA presents a 
mutilated vision of what has been an agenda constructed over the course of 
many years” wrote Oilwatch (2012). 
Indeed, what is the legitimacy of a MCE if important stakeholders (such as EJOs) 
do not acknowledge any of the scenarios evaluated? Also, what is the legitimacy 
of a MCE if EJOs feel betrayed by the indicators used? The keyword answer to 
avoid this is: participation/deliberation. From the beginning, a realistic MCE on an 
issue such as ‘leaving oil in the ground’ must include the participation of 
stakeholders in order to have as much reality-checks as possible. It is in the 
essence of a MCE to be able to acknowledge all positions, including the most 
radically opposed ones. “Acción Ecológica believes that tools such as multi-criteria 
analyses and assessments can be useful, but when there is a disconnection with 
local processes, they can be confusing and even dangerous” (Oilwatch, 2012). 
Activists (even of the most radical kind) who find it potentially useful to participate 
in a MCE that will rank alternative positions (including their own) must help 
building scenarios, criteria and indicators that will eventually make it clear that 
their positions is the most reasonable. They should also be able to oppose the use 
of some misleading indicators (such as GDP) provided that they can convince a 
majority of stakeholders that these indicators will only add more confusion to the 
MCE. But for such a process to be possible at all, a convincing MCE must involve 
substantial participation and deliberation. 
The Yasuní-ITT 
initiative is indeed 
still very fragile and 
Oilwatch favours the 
strategy of 
“scandalisation” 
“Acción Ecológica 
believes that tools 
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MCEs are tools not aimed at fostering conflict – which can sometimes be the only 
constructive thing to do – but they are instruments that provide opportunities for 
discussing, learning, understanding, convincing, and that may strengthen the 
activist side, including, simply, by fully legitimizing their values and viewpoints. 
 
4.5 Final remarks about the Yasuní-ITT initiative 
The history of conflicts in the Yasuní highlights the inherent contradictions 
between global oil-based metabolic needs on the one hand, and biodiversity 
conservation and indigenous rights on the other. It illustrates the necessity to go 
beyond monetary valuation and puts on the table the need to move towards a 
‘post-oil society’. This move can only be based (among other things) on the 
selective ‘degrowth’ of the North’s industrialized metabolism, a metabolism way 
too hungry for resources and energy, and on making concrete steps towards a 
post-oil economy leaving the oil in the soil. This is the only sensible response to 
climate change and unsustainability. 
The Yasuní-ITT initiative sparked the imagination of many and facilitated an 
important public debate among the population. According to a survey run in 2011, 
public support in Ecuador for the initiative had raised from 58% to 75% (Rival, 
2011). Many Ecuadorian citizens were thus challenging the idea that their country 
is ‘too poor to be green’ and too poor to afford leaving oil in the soil. Whether the 
use of a deliberative and fine-tuned MCE would support these claims is likely but it 
remains to be done. 
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5 
Diverting the waters 
of the São Francisco 
River (Northeastern 
Brazil) 
Neo-developmentalism against 
environmental justice?  
 
Philippe Roman 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The project to divert part of the waters of the São Francisco River to the semi-arid 
region of Northeast Brazil (Transposição do rio São Francisco, hereafter TSF
6
) is 
a long-lasting environmental conflict, maybe the greatest one in Brazil’s 
environmental history. Since the 19
th
 century and the endorsement of the idea by 
the last Brazilian emperor, Dom Pedro II
7
, the project is part of the debates on 
water scarcity and recurrent droughts in the semi-arid area of Brazil. First 
proposed after the great drought of 1875, it was recurrently modified and debated 
during more than a century, though never implemented because of technical 
hardships (not least the lack of energy to pump water and drive it beyond the hills 
on the Northern axis).  
 
 
6
    Commonly known as “Transposição do São Francisco”, the project is officially called “Projeto de 
Integração do Rio São Francisco com Bacias Hidrográficas do Nordeste Setentrional” (PISF). See 
(in Portuguese): http://www.mi.gov.br/projeto-sao-francisco1. 
7
    The project was first proposed after the great drought of 1875. 
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Awaited by some as a cornucopia, and harshly criticized by many for being a 
technical extravagance useful only to the wealthiest, the TSF has become a highly 
contentious subject. However, the idea was never abandoned, and the 
technocratic elite has kept on envisioning it as a challenge to be faced up to. Once 
technically insurmountable, the construction of hundreds of kilometres of canals 
through dry regions has become possible, and the TSF was taken up by the end 
of the 1990s. It was the president Lula, born in a dry region of Pernambuco state, 
who launched the project
8
. 
The works started in 2007 and are still under way. Supposed to bring water to 12 
million people through the continuous diversion of 26,4m
3
/s
9
 along more than 
600km of canals and tunnels, the project is still fraught with uncertainties, 
especially as to who will really benefit from it. The processes of evaluation and 
design of the project have actually failed to make true democratic expression and 
participation a reality, while distributional issues raised by most experts and civil 
society organizations (CSOs) have not properly been addressed. The risk is to 
spend huge amounts of money for an unsustainable infrastructure, while not 
reducing environmental injustices in the Northeast.  
 
 
 
 
 
8
    He considers the project as a gift to his fatherland, the deprived Northeast. 
9
    The offical description of the project is available on the website of the Ministério da Integração: 
http://www.integracao.gov.br/pt/web/guest/o-que-e-o-projeto. 
Picture 3 
Ex-President Lula in a 
TSF canal, in Cabrobó, 
Pernambuco State  
Source: Wikimedia 
commons, 
http://upload.wikimedia.or
g/wikipedia/commons/0/0
2/LulaemCabrobo.jpg 
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5.2 Stakeholders and their ‘value systems’ 
The TSF involves many stakeholders, from different natures and regions. The 
geographic extension of the project outlines an environmental conflict involving 
persons and institutions as far as several hundreds kilometres, and from lay 
citizens to the Federal State. 
The main stakeholders are the Federal Government (mainly through its Integration 
Ministry
10
), the states affected (as givers or receptors of the water) by the project, 
agribusiness and industries of the targeted regions, scattered rural households, 
water-related institutional entities (such as ANA, CNRH or CBHSF
11
) and civil 
society organizations (NGOs, syndicates, associations etc.). We may also 
consider as significant stakeholders: the companies involved in the construction of 
the canals, urban residents in big cities of the Northern coast, as well as riverside 
fishers of the São Francisco River or people displaced by the construction of the 
waterways. 
The Federal Government is eager to implement the long awaited TSF: it is a proof 
of consideration to the less developed Northeast Brazil and a way to promote 
economic growth. The region, considered as underdeveloped and abandoned by 
the State, has now come to focus national attention. As one of the costliest lots of 
its “Growth Acceleration Programme” (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, 
PAC), the National Government wants to make the TSF a symbol of its 
developmental achievements. Indeed, the growth potential is high in the 
Northeast, some regions are economically booming (port and industrial districts 
close to Recife or Fortaleza), and several big infrastructure projects are under way 
(railway connexions, big ports on the Atlantic coast, other waterways as the Canal 
da integração etc.). Hence, the TSF is part of an economic surge, mainly oriented 
towards the export of raw materials and agricultural products. By promoting a 
project as the TSF, the Federal State is also supposed to bridge an ecological gap 
between water-rich and water-poor regions and hence to promote some kind of 
geographical-environmental justice, in terms of water availability. The principal 
beneficiaries of the TSF are supposed to be poor households and farmers of the 
semi-arid Northeast, but the real rationale behind the project seems to be a ‘neo-
developmentist’ one: huge investments in big infrastructure projects designed to 
foster the circulation of resources and to extend the extraction/production frontiers. 
Initially very prudent on the matter, the National Water Agency (Agência Nacional 
da Água, ANA) came lately to support the project. Its vision is one of technical 
solutions to the problem of water availability/scarcity, but from a more water-
oriented perspective and more aware of the realities of water issues. The ANA 
 
 
10
   The "Integration Ministry" – Ministério da Integração, MI – is in charge of great infrastructure 
projects, including the TSF. 
11
   ANA: Agência Nacional de Águas (National Water Agency); CNRH: Conselho Nacional de 
Recursos Hídricos (National Water Resources Council); CBHSF: Comitê da Bacia Hidrográfica do 
Rio São Francisco (São Francisco River Basin Committee). 
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published in 2006 an ‘Atlas of the Northeast’ (Atlas do Nordeste), a collection of 
practical solutions to water availability problems in the Northeast. 
The state of Ceará is a key stakeholder since it is the most interested in the 
project, as prime receptor of the diverted water (through the Northern axis)
12
. The 
economic interest of Ceará state in the TSF is unambiguous: beyond better water 
resources availability during drought periods, it will help release water restrictions 
on its agricultural and industrial development. 
The Basin Committee of the São Francisco River (Comitê de Bacia Hidrográfica 
do Rio São Francisco) was created in 2001. It is the most democratic and 
hopefully representative body of the River area. As an institution representing the 
interests of groups of people living within the São Francisco basin, it issued 
technical and political stances leaving the door open to the TSF, but with clear 
restrictions: in solidarity with other states’ people, the diversion of a limited 
quantity of water was allowed, only for human and animal consumption purposes. 
Conscious of the gigantic dimensions of the project and of the potential negative 
effects on a river whose riparians are often unable to use the water, the Basin 
Council is probably the institutional body which best dealswith the contradictory 
visions and interests of various stakeholders. Nonetheless, its decisions were 
overcome by the National Water Council (Conselho Nacional de Recursos 
Hídricos, CNRH
13
). 
As far as donor states are concerned, most of political representatives, technical 
bodies, NGOs and citizens long voiced their discontent with the project. They will 
get scarcely any benefit from it, while potentially high costs through a reduction in 
the available water upstream of the diversion canals and thus less development 
opportunities. Their opposition to the project is all the clearer that their interests 
have not been taken into account in the impact assessments of the project (RIMA, 
Relatório de IMpacto Ambiental). In particular, the state of Minas Gerais 
repeatedly voiced its concern about the TSF, and the feeling is widespread among 
mineiros that they have been disregarded. 
While big landowners of the targeted region view positively the arrival of new 
freshwater (allowing a better ‘synergy’ in the use of water reservoirs
14
) as a means 
of improving reliability of water quantities, the viewpoint of little farmers and poor 
households of the semi-árido is not that easy to grasp, and it is more likely being 
manipulated by local and national political elites. The Federal State is prone to 
assert that the poorest strongly back the project, but to our knowledge, nothing 
confirms such an assertion. 
 
 
12
   Cícero Gomes, ex-governor of the state of Ceará, was a strong supporter of the project as he was 
Ministro da Integração between 2003 and 2006. 
13
   Contrary to the politically balanced representation of stakeholders in the Basin Committee, the 
Federal Government holds a strong position in the National Water Council: it had half plus one 
seats when the Council voted in favour of the TSF in 2005. 
14
   Called açudes. 
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Undoubtedly, the great majority of civil society organizations have been struggling 
against the project since decades. Among the most directly involved, the 
“Manuelzão project” (Projeto Manuelzão), the Pastoral da Terra, and the 
Articulação do Semi-Árido. As grassroots organizations, they tend to advocate 
small-scale alternative hydraulic projects such as wells, underground dams, 
cisterns to store rainwater, better interconnection of scattered households with 
public reservoirs, land reform etc. They share the idea of ‘living with the semi-arid’ 
(convivência com o semi-árido), i.e. making use of the various opportunities 
offered by local conditions rather than depend on water coming from distant 
sources and megaprojects prone to be controlled by powerful regional elites. They 
had to repeatedly deal with the accusation of, being against the project, being 
against those who suffer most from water stress, i.e. the poorest. 
To sum up, while economic and political elites (especially in receptor states) have 
been preaching the social and developmental benefits of the TSF, civil society 
organizations and most experts
15
 have pointed to the unsustainability of the 
project, disregard for local socio-ecological realities and environmental justice 
issues. 
 
 
 
15
   Among the most reknowned experts on water issues in the Northeast who took an active part in the 
TSF are João Suassuna (Fundação Joaquim Nabuco), João Abner Guimarães Jr. (Universidade 
Federal do Rio Grande do Norte), Aziz Ab’Saber (Universidade de São Paulo, †2012), Apolo 
Heringer Lisboa (Manuelzão Project) and Manoel Bonfim Ribeiro (ex-director of the DNOCS – 
Departamento Nacional de Obras Contra a Seca, National Department of Works Against Drought, 
†2012). 
Picture 4: The São Francisco River 
Source: Wikimedia commons / http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:RioSaoFrancisco.jpg 
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5.3 The contested situation: What is at stake with the 
TSF? What are the most pressing issues? 
The contested situation is rooted in the difficulty to unveil the true objectives of the 
project, say: is it a developmentalist project destined to bring water to powerful 
landowners and to foster export-oriented growth, or is it a project designed to 
relieve poor households from painful water collection tasks and recurrent water 
stress
16
? 
Unlike other environmental conflicts, the TSF case involves the State as a chief 
(and ambiguous) protagonist. It has used strong pro-poor rhetoric and 
communication from the outset, showing images of starving animals and thirsty 
children to underline the humanitarian urgency of the project. But at the same 
time, there remain huge gaps in the implementation of the ANA recommendations, 
a collection of concrete actions deemed to be twice cheaper than the TSF and 
reaching almost three times more persons. 
The proponents of the project argue that it will have only negligible negative 
impacts, since it will divert less than 1.5% of the São Francisco River’s flow. But 
the quantity diverted exceeds the quantity available (once computed all the other 
uses in the basin), as pointed out by many hydraulic experts and by the very Basin 
Committee of the São Francisco River (Comitê de Bacia Hidrográfica do Rio São 
Francisco). As decided/stated by the Basin Committee, the only permitted use of 
the São Francisco River’s water out of its basin is human and animal 
consumption. But as time passes, it becomes increasingly clear that irrigated 
agriculture and industry will benefit (disproportionately) from the water diverted, 
which reinforces the idea that the original official discourse was somewhat 
misleading. 
Many denounce a “draught industry” (indústria da seca) interested not in the 
socio-technical battle against draught but in pharaonic works and emergency 
assistance. As to 2013, while the worst drought in decades is hitting Brazil’s 
Northeast, the TSF is not working yet (its cost already doubled and delays will 
probably exceed 4 years, with an expected completion by the end of 2015) and 
carros-pipa (‘water trucks’) are once again mobilized to attend the poorest’ 
needs
17
. 
Beside the manipulation of drought by political and economic elites, the central 
issue in the TSF conflict is the destination of diverted water. Most critics foresee a 
situation in which water would first benefit agribusiness
18
 (tropical fruits and 
shrimp farming mainly) and industries (especially the port and industrial complex 
of Pecém, Ceará state). 
 
 
16
   Additional information on the issues at stake and a timeline of the conflict can be found (in English 
and Italian) on the CDCA (Centro di Documentazione sui Conflitti Ambientali) website: 
http://www.cdca.it/ spip.php?article1616&lang=en. 
17
   One of the main arguments in favor of the TSF is that it will end with carros-pipa as an emergency 
fix to bring water to drought-stricken areas, thus helping to make substantial economies. 
18
   Some even speak of ‘hydrobusiness’ (‘hidronegócio’). 
  
 
 
Page 53 
 
 
Diverting the waters of the São Francisco River  
Top managers of the project say that the Federal State is doing its part, and local 
political leaders have to jump on the train of the TSF in order to benefit from its full 
potentialities. But local political elites too often have neither will nor means to build 
the required facilities. So, only well organized and financially robust actors will 
take advantage of an increased water supply. Unfortunately, such political gaps 
are hardly addressed in preliminary studies or impact assessments. 
To sum up, if it reveals what its critics fear, the project will reinforce a development 
pattern of subsidized water-intensive activities, while not addressing the needs of 
poor rural households. 
 
5.4 Valuation methods 
The valuation methods used to appraise the relevance of the project are as 
follows: the Ministry of Integration basically based its reflections on a detailed 
evaluation of benefits in the receptor areas. The assessment of costs was done in 
the Environmental Impact Assessment Report – EIA-RIMA (Estudo de Impacto 
Ambiental – Relatório de Impacto Ambiental
19
), which did not monetized the 
impacts. Numerous stakeholders underlined the limited scope of impacts 
assessed, which is partly due to a lack of participation through evaluation phase. 
Though in the RIMA the number of negative impacts exceeded the number of 
positive impacts, the conclusion of the document was clearly in favour of the 
project. Quite interestingly and as pointed out above, the specific difficulties linked 
to the lack of political will to build complementary facilities to the TSF necessary to 
transport water to poor households were not really addressed. So, reasoning as if 
the TSF were about to work in a world without frictions biases the evaluation in 
favour of the most powerful. 
Among the shortcomings of the evaluation process are the time lags between the 
design of the project by state bureaucrats and the presentation of the project in 
the affected areas. Most of the important decisions about the project have been 
made by the time when the impact assessment process was undertaken. The 
socio-environmental impact assessment process comes after the technical-
financial viability studies are completed and impact assessments have the limited 
function to localize where compensation procedures should be followed. 
Therefore, the TSF was not designed in a fully collaborative way with concerned 
stakeholders. However, the government eventually came to (partially) take 
account of civil society’s demands (e.g. the ‘revitalization’ of the São Francisco 
river), which demonstrates that the mobilization was not in vain. 
To our knowledge, there does not exist any alternative (multicriterial) evaluation of 
the project. It is probably due to the high complexity and extension of the project. 
Nevertheless, the project was scrutinized in many ways by many different 
observers, institutions, experts or researchers since decades. While some of them 
lamented the lack of information and data on key issues, many expressed very 
 
 
19
   The document can be downloaded here: http://www.mi.gov.br/projeto-sao-francisco1. 
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critical opinions on the idea to divert the São Francisco River’s waters. Even the 
World Bank showed the limits of the project and the necessity to implement other 
actions before such a megaproject is contemplated. Not least, the SBPC 
(Sociedade Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência
20
) adopted a critical stance as 
well. 
An extensive review of the literature on the subject suggests that positive 
appraisals of the project on the part of academics are quite scarce. The most 
notable works released to date are very critical of the project
21
. Once again, the 
innumerate and long-standing problems linked to the TSF are rooted in a lack of 
transparency about who will benefit from the project and who will pay for it. The 
question “who will benefit from the water transfer?” (“a quem vai servir a 
transposição das águas?”) has become recurrent in the writings and public 
stances of the (late) renowned geographer Aziz Ab’Sáber
22
. It is the same line of 
argument that the engineer João Suassuna, researcher at the Joaquim Nabuco 
Foundation (Fundação Joaquim Nabuco), has been following since more than a 
decade
23
. Actually, the Environmental Impact Report (EIA-RIMA) says that 70% of 
the diverted water will go to irrigation and industrial uses, 26% to urban 
consumption, and only 4% to scattered households. 
Hence the necessity to introduce a true balance in the cost-benefit analysis. That 
is what is proposed by the organization FASE
24
 in collaboration with the Urban 
and Regional Research and Planning Center of the Rio de Janeiro Federal 
University
25
. They propose a new instrument of evaluation, complementary to the 
classical EIA-RIMAs, called “Environmental Equity Evaluation” (Avaliação de 
Equidade Ambiental, AEA)
26
. The objective is to democratize the impact 
assessment of development projects and to better handle social and distributive 
issues. The proposal to add an ‘environmental equity evaluation’ to the traditional 
impact assessments is especially important in a place where development 
projects are most frequently following external interests and scarcely benefit local 
populations, especially the poorest. Export-oriented megaprojects should thus be 
more precisely scrutinized before they are implemented, in order not to turn social 
inequalities more acute. 
Another way forward to fill in the gap of the evaluation of inter-basin water 
transfers would be to follow guidelines similar to those advocated for dam projects 
 
 
20
   Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science. 
21
   See for example Suassuna (2011). 
22
   In Portuguese, see: http://tinyurl.com/cvy75kr. 
23
   See: http://www.fundaj.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=630&Itemid=376. 
24
   Fundação de Atendimento Sócio-Educativo (Foundation for Socio-Educational Service). 
25
   Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano e Regional da Universidade Federal do Rio de 
Janeiro (IPPUR/UFRJ) 
26
   FASE/ETTERN (2011) Relatório Síntese: Projeto Avaliação de Equidade Ambiental como 
instrumento de democratização dos procedimentos de avaliação de impacto de projetos de 
desenvolvimento, Rio de Janeiro. 
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by the World Commission on Dams (WCD)
27
. The idea was proposed by the WWF 
in a 2007 report on inter-basin water transfers
28
. The WCD, set up in 1997, 
consisted of members of civil society, the private sector, academia, professional 
associations and one government representative. In 2000, it issued a report 
reviewing a wide array of case studies and issues on dam construction in 
developing countries, and including key recommendations for the appraisal of dam 
projects. Since then, the report gained a widespread uptake, and 
recommendations have partly been followed (the most popular items are ‘Gaining 
public acceptance’ and ‘Recognising entitlements and sharing benefits’). 
 
5.5 What lessons from this case? 
Many say that the TSF will never occur, or else will never deliver freshwater to 
those for whom it was deemed to be originally designed. As pointed out by the 
Federal Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Contas da União), every day appears a 
new problem requiring a new technical fix and new spendings. Building companies 
make money and political elites keep on trying to gain votes promising the project 
will redeem their region. 
What lessons can be learned from the TSF conflict? 
First, it is useful to share a same vocabulary / rationale to advance a common 
counter-vision and counter-projects. The articulation of watchwords such as 
‘convivência com o semi-arido’ (‘living with the semi-arid’) and ‘revitalização sim, 
transposição não’ (‘revitalization yes, transposition no’) with calls for ‘socio-
environmental justice’ helped to frame the rationale of CSOs as legitimate and 
coherent
29
. This may have helped to force the State to set up a more ambitious 
‘revitalization’ agenda
30
. Definitely, civil society organizations have convincingly 
combined three streams of rationale: development should respect local 
environmental conditions and consider them as opportunities rather than fatal 
constraints to be overcome (adaptation); water scarcity is as much a socio-political 
problem as a natural one (denunciation of the socio-political status quo); projects 
should enhance socio-environmental justice (environmentalism of the poor / 
environmental justice discourse). 
As far as evaluation issues are concerned, the question remains: how to make a 
good evaluation of a project entailing so many and so diverse consequences, 
affecting such a wide array of stakeholders? While a mere cost-benefit analysis 
 
 
27
   The WCD’s final report can be downloaded here: 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/dams-and-development-a-new-framework-for-
decision-making-3939. 
28
   WWF (2007) Pipedreams?Interbasin water transfers and water shortages, June 2007, Global 
Freshwater Programme. 
29
   Not to mention the support by renowned experts. 
30
   Seeing the glass half empty, the ‘revitalization’ package was granted as a counterpart to the 
adoption of the TSF. 
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(all the more if strictly monetary) is not sufficient at all, multicriteria frameworks are 
hard to apply too. Hence the importance to follow some guidelines and to keep in 
mind some principles, as those listed in the WCD report. Although it was not 
applied in this case, the idea to impose an Environmental Equity Evaluation prior 
to any big development project should be of interest for the future. If it were 
applied in the case of the TSF, the project would have probably been radically 
modified if not rejected. 
To conclude, let us emphasize that project evaluations cannot be mere marginal 
modulations of otherwise technocratic decisions. The obligation to clearly identify 
and make public (at the earliest stages) who will benefit from the project, and at 
what cost (including the likeliness of key complementary works being completed 
by local powers), should be part of the evaluation of the opportunity of any big 
development project. 
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6 
Valuation 
contests over 
India’s forests 
Julien-François Gerber 
 
What is the value of the forests in India? Right now, as per net present value, one 
hectare of forest in India costs anything between USD 8000 and 19,000. In the 
present chapter, we will see how economists and authorities came up with this 
result and the problems it poses. 
These amounts of money have to be paid to authorities each time a given forest is 
destroyed and converted to another use. The ‘net present value’ (see Box 1 
below) has been adopted as an economic tool to calculate the compensatory 
value of the destroyed forests. The revenues are collected in a fund managed by a 
central governmental body; they are then used for ‘compensating’ the forest 
losses in the form of afforestation and reforestation projects elsewhere.
31
 Up until 
today, the process has generated a few hundreds of millions of US dollars – and a 
lot of uncertainties as to what will be done with this (Awasthi, 2008). 
As we will see, the idea of estimating the value of forests and asking a price from 
any party demanding their use was partly a response to increasing deforestation 
rates but also to the related numerous conflicts. In India, indeed, many small and 
large forests have been destroyed by hydroelectric dams, mining projects or 
infrastructure developments. These development projects reflect the growing 
metabolism of the Indian economy, a metabolism hungry for land, raw materials 
and energy. While the idea was in a way path-breaking – for the first time forests 
were officially considered as more than just timber –, the issues of ‘valuation’ and 
‘compensation’ remain highly questionable. How to decide whether a forest should 
be flooded by a dam or destroyed by an open cast coal mine? Can we really 
calculate the ‘value’ of keeping the forest compared to the ‘value’ of the new 
industrial project, reaching a conclusion accepted by society? Which are the 
relevant values and for whom? 
 
 
31
   Afforestation is the plantation of trees on land that were not covered by forests and reforestation is 
the plantation of trees on land previously forested. 
The development 
projects in India 
reflect the growing 
metabolism of the 
country’s economy, a 
metabolism hungry for 
land, raw materials 
and energy. 
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6.1 The stakeholders and their values: some 
historical background 
The first hundred years of British rule witnessed a colossal plunder of half of 
India’s forests. The timber went to feed the railways and the shipyards in both 
India and England. The cleared land were settled to white planters (for tea, coffee, 
indigo and sugarcane) and to the native ‘zamindars’, the new class of landlords 
created by the British. In 1864, the first forest administration for the Empire was 
created. In 1868 and 1878, India was ‘endowed’ with its first forest policy and 
forest act, which prescribed, among other things, banishing indigenous 
communities from the forest and restricting forest usage by them. The British 
proclaimed all ‘unsettled’ and ‘ownerless’ resources like pastures and forests 
‘eminent domain’, which meant that forests became state property (S. Ghosh, 
2006). 
The main technical advisers were German experts trained in tree plantation 
economics. Their policy was to grow uniform stands of trees as long as it was 
economic to do so, comparing the rate of growth of the trees (multiplied by 
expected price, net of cutting costs) to the rate of interest in the bank. Scientific 
forest management became the key that would make forests more homogenous 
and productive. ‘Homogenisation’ was the magic word with which every working 
plan of India’s forests started. It was obvious, however, that forests in India were 
used by the local populations for ‘non-timber’ products; they held much 
biodiversity and provided many environmental services (Gadgil and Guha 1992; 
1995). 
Between 1864 and 1947, Indian forests were ‘ordered’, with neat rows of pines 
(Pinus sp.), sal (Shorea robusta) and teak (Tectona grandis) monocultures. In fact, 
forests were increasingly being managed as plantation estates and ‘forest villages’ 
(new colonies of plantation workers) were being set up inside natural forests (S. 
Ghosh, 2006). Soon after Dietrich Brandis, the ‘father of Indian forestry’, had 
developed the ‘taungya’ forestry system, the latter became the major plantation 
method not only in India, but also in several Asian and African countries. 
Politically, the system offered a temporary solution to the problem of increasing 
tribal unrest in forest areas. Taungya villages were allocated zones where 
inhabitants could clear natural forests and burn the area to raise food crops. But 
after some time, the cultivators had to raise commercial plantations on that land. 
From peasants, they became plantation workers. 
In independent India, the forest department continued with the task of 
homogenizing forests, and the 1952 forest policy fostered aggressive commercial 
forestry (Guha, 1989). More than 17 million hectares of plantations came up in 
next 38 years, until the new Forest Policy of 1988 prescribed a moratorium on 
clearing natural forests. Though the 1988 policy talked about integrating livelihood 
and biomass needs of forest communities, plantations programmes in India 
continued to be governed by industrial and urban consumers’ needs. According to 
the FAO Forest Resources Assessment (2010), India has more than 10 million 
hectares of plantations and the area continues to increase rapidly. 
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While plantations continue growing, forest-dependant indigenous people, 
peasants and former plantation workers are mostly deprived of all rights. In many 
areas, the Forest Department threatens them with eviction. As S. Ghosh (2006) 
puts it, “There can hardly be better instances of a sovereign state declaring a 
whole body of its citizens persona non grata, and waging a war against them. The 
stage [is] set for a full-scale market invasion in terms of carbon trade and 
ecosystem services trading, [a context in which] forest communities struggle 
against the twin menace of production and protection forestry”. 
 
 Total value 
Stakeholders 
Extractive direct 
use values 
Extractive direct 
exchange values 
Non-extractive 
direct values 
Indirect values 
Preservation 
values 
Local forest 
users 
Forest and 
agricultural 
products 
(subsistence) 
Forest and agricultural 
products (sale) 
Cultural and 
spiritual 
values 
Microclimate, hydrological, 
soil conservation and 
nutrient cycling 
Preserving values 
for descendants 
Commercial 
interests 
 
Timber, commercial 
NTFPs, pharmaceutical 
material, or any non-
forest-based project 
Tourism 
Downstream 
irrigation/water benefits to 
commercial farmers, water 
and electricity companies, 
and other businesses 
Undiscovered 
commercial 
potentials 
National 
interests (e.g. 
Forestry 
Department)  
 
Forest revenue and 
foreign exchange 
Recreation, 
tourism, 
education, 
science 
National environmental 
services (e.g. watershed 
protection) 
Sustained wood 
supply and 
environmental 
services 
Global interests  
Globally traded 
products (e.g. timber) 
Tourism, 
science 
Global environmental 
services (e.g. carbon 
sinks) 
Climate change 
mitigation 
 
 
 
6.2 Valuation methods 
Partly because of rapid deforestation and partly because of the related conflicts, 
the Supreme Court of India started since 1995 to play a central role in matters of 
forest governance. A year later, any area which complied with the definition of a 
forest would need to compensated for if it were to be converted in non-forest use. 
With this objective in mind, the Supreme Court set up of a ‘Compensatory 
Afforestation Planning and Management Authority’ (CAMPA) and launched a 
system of payment of Net Present Value (NPV) for the forest to be destroyed for 
other land use. In 2005, the Court also ordered the setting up of an expert 
committee directed by environmental economist Kanchan Chopra (Director of the 
Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi) to examine a range of issues with 
respect to NPV and submit a report. 
 
 
 
Table 10:Summary of the values of the different stakeholders over India’s forests 
 (adapted from Richards et al., 2003). 
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Box 1: net present value and discount rates 
What is the net present value (NPV)? The NPV is a calculation technique used to estimate the net 
benefit of a particular project (or ecosystem) over a given period of time. When applied to a forest 
land diversion, the NPV is understood as thetotal value that compensates, in money terms, for the 
loss of all thepresent and future benefits – commercial (e.g. timber value) and natural (e.g. water and 
biodiversity value) – flowing from the forest land due to its diversion to non-forest use. In the present 
case, the new user of the forest is expected to bear the cost of these losses by the payment of the 
NPV. 
More concretely, the Chopra committee fixed the NPV on the basis of the net flow accruing over 20 
years at a 5% discount rate. But what is a discount rate? The discount rate is a rate used to convert 
future value into current or present value. For instance, if somebody offers to pay to you 105 € one 
year from now, the present value is 100 € at a discount rate of 5% (this is because you would earn 
interest of 5 € on a deposit of 100 €). Conventionally, values in the distant future tend to have present 
values close to nothing. Thus, discounting reflects the balance between present and future well-
being. Low discount rates imply that future values are seen as important while high discount rates 
imply giving low values to future damages. 
It is interesting to note that in this Indian case, the definition of a ‘just’ discount rate was the object of 
a ‘bargaining’ reflecting a conflict of values and interests. The Chopra committee recommended a 
standard discount rate of 5%. In response, business lobbies argued that this rate was too low. This 
was actually their main point of contention on the report. They used a paper published by the Asian 
Development Bank saying that India should use a social discount rate of 12%. However, the 
Supreme Court’s Central Empowered Committee (CEC, see below) reduced even further the 
proposed discount rate and suggested 4%. The CEC had made consultation with other economists 
who were of the opinion that the social discount rate should be around 2% in India. Following this, the 
Supreme Court judges wrote: “We do not find much force in the contention advanced by the 
[business sector representatives]. The 10% suggested by them cannot be applied to the present case 
because 10% is the rate linked to assumptions about the opportunity cost of capital. One cannot 
apply that rate for social time preference in evaluating the benefits from an environmental resource 
such as forests. In project evaluation, the horizon is compatible with the life of the project whereas in 
forest matters, the horizon spans over several generations. Therefore, the rate of 10%, as suggested 
by the user agency cannot be accepted” (SC, 2008). 
When the conservation of the natural environment is at stake, some economists (as John Krutilla) 
indeed argue for very low discount rates. The reason is that for projects with long time horizons, any 
discounting reduces future costs and benefits almost to zero after a finite number of years. This 
implies a bias in favour of projects with either short-term benefits (e.g. commercialprojects) or long-
term costs (e.g. a nuclear power plant). In both cases, the well-being of future generations is in 
danger. Given this, some economists argue that intergenerational equity justifies no discounting at 
all. Others have even gone further and argued for negative discounting to reflect a need for greater 
protection of the interests of future generations, as for example in the case of irreversible outcomes 
such as global warming (Hali et al., 2012). 
 
The valuation process had to start with a forest definition. The Chopra committee 
followed the FAO definition of a forest as an area having a tree canopy cover of 
more than 10% over an area of more than 0.5 hectares, with forestry as the 
principal land use. According to this definition, forests are nothing more than a 
collection of trees and therefore include the most intensive tree monocultures. 
Obviously, trees are indeed crucial elements of a forest, but what this definition 
leaves out is that forests are also composed of a huge diversity of plants, insects, 
birds and animals, as well as forest-dependent peoples. Legitimizing industrial 
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tree plantations as ‘forests’ helps companies convince authorities that the 
deforestation they cause can be compensated by tree plantations. For more than 
10 years, various EJOs such as the World Rainforest Movement have been 
campaigning to make the FAO change its forest definition.
32
 
Some of the key points of the committee’s report are the following. The NPV is 
payable only for forest areas under the ownership of the forest department and 
should be entirely site specific.
33
 The committee recommended 12 steps that 
should be followed in order to determine the NPV as well as the claims by the 
relevant stakeholders. These include the legal status of the land involved, its 
classification, the kinds of products and services to be valued (such as timber, 
carbon storage, ecotourism and NTFP). The last step deals with the determination 
of compensation to the major stakeholders, namely locals, state forest 
departments and the central government. The different amounts collected as NPV 
are deposited in funds administered by the CAMPA. They are then used for 
compensating the forest losses in the form of afforestation and reforestation 
projects.
34
 
Since 2008, the calculation of the NPV is at the rate of USD 8000 to 19,000 per 
hectare based on a detailed chart prepared by the Supreme Court’s Central 
Empowered Committee (CEC), a monitoring body on forest-related matters. This 
chart describes how the NPV should vary according to the class of forest a 
particular area belongs to. Within each class of forests (e.g. evergreen, moist, 
swamp or subalpine), the forests are further classified into very dense, dense, and 
open. The maximum NPV is prescribed for Class I and II (i.e. very dense forest); 
the minimum rate fixed for Class IV (open dense forests). Regarding conservation 
areas, the CEC prescribes that permission can be considered on payment of an 
amount equal to 10 times in the case of National Parks and 5 times in the case of 
Sanctuaries respectively of the NPV payable for such areas. 
For calculating the average NPV per hectare, the CEC accords a monetary value 
to seven aspects that it considers to be either a ‘good’ or a ‘service’. The value of 
the goods and services is seen as proportional to the forest’s density. Foremost in 
this classification of forest goods and services are the value of timber and fuel 
wood followed by the value of NTFP, of fodder, eco-tourism and bio-prospecting. 
Ecological services of forests and value of flagship forest species are next. The 
CEC also lists carbon sequestration as one of the services while calculating NPV. 
 
 
32
   The most recent action took place in January 2012 when the German environmental organization 
Rainforest Rescue presented the director-general of the FAO with more than 27,000 signatures in 
support of an initiative by 613 scientists and professionals in the natural sciences calling on FAO to 
amend its definition of ‘forest’. 
33
   Activities which should be given full exemptions include public works like schools, hospitals, 
children’s playgrounds, municipal water supply, relocation of villages from conservation areas and 
so on. 
34
   It was recommended that all projects will also be liable to pay ground rent – which goes to the state 
coffers – irrespective of exemption levels with respect to NPV and subject to a minimum of USD 
180 per ha. 
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The more dense the forest, the better its ability to store carbon. These 
recommendations were accepted by the Supreme Court and also by the Ministry 
of Environment and Forests. 
 
6.3 The contested situation 
Since 2009, the compensation fund is being used for almost exactly the same 
purposes by the State Forest Departments as what has been done through other 
afforestation schemes and programmes till date (Kohli et al., 2011). For instance, 
the state of Uttarakhand has allocated about USD 115,000 for tree monocultures 
through local Joint Forest Management (JFM) committees. In Karnataka, the 
money has also been used for plantations including commercial plants like 
agrofuels. These plantations are to be taken up in places near the existing JFM 
committees with a total budget of 25 million of dollars as ‘assisted natural 
regeneration’. Similarly, Madhya Pradesh has proposed that 38.8% of their total 
NPV budget for 2010-2011 will be used for tree plantations, and Himachal 
Pradesh 28.4% (Kohli et al., 2011). These developments are likely not to solve 
valuation conflicts – quite the opposite actually. Struggle over tree monocultures 
expressed as conflicts of valuation languages were – and still are – numerous. Let 
us turn to some illustrations, historical as well as contemporary. 
The Chipko movement (1973–1980) is perhaps the most famous case of Southern 
environmentalism (Guha, 1989; Shiva, 1989). It involved local resistance to state-
controlled pine plantations in Uttarakhand (Himalayan region). Through an 
innovative technique protest, peasants threatened to hug forest trees rather than 
allow them to be logged for export and replaced by plantations. Forests were used 
by the local populations for NTFPs. The Chipko movement influenced many socio-
environmental movements in India. In 1983 for example, a similar conflict took 
place in Karnataka (Shiva, 1989; Gadgil and Guha, 1992). The destruction of 
mixed semi-evergreen forests, and replacement by teak and eucalypt plantations, 
denied people access to biomass for fodder, food, fertiliser, etc. The deforestation 
had led to severe soil erosion and drying up of perennial water resources. Moved 
by these impacts, the youth of local villages launched a movement locally known 
as ‘Appiko Chaluvali’ (Appiko means ‘to hug’ in Kannada), inspired by the Chipko 
movement. They embraced the trees to be felled by contractors of the forest 
department. They also extracted an oath from the loggers (on the local forest 
deity) to the effect that they would not destroy trees in that forest. The protest 
continued for 38 days and finally the felling orders were withdrawn. The success 
of this agitation spread tomany other places in the entire forest division. The rapid 
increase of the movement was based on evidence that the forest department was 
overexploiting the forests. 
From the mid-19th century onwards, the indigenous peoples of Chhattisgarhhave 
lost their rights to the forests as a result of outside interference, as in the Bastar 
Forestry Project which was jointly funded by the World Bank and the Indian 
Government in 1975 (Anderson and Huber, 1988; Gadgil and Guha, 1992). The 
objective was to develop and industrialise this ‘backward’ region through 40,000 
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hectares of industrial plantation of the Caribbean pine (Pinus caribaea) for which 
the natural forests had to be cleared. What were the conflicting values at stake? 
For the Forestry Development Corporation, trees are resources to be grown and 
cut for profit; the Forest Department views the forests as a capital that needs to be 
protected from intruders, especially the ‘tribals’; the planners and experts are 
interested in the technical issues of supplying raw material for the mill; and for the 
indigenous peoples, the forest is an important source of income and sustenance, 
and a means of survival during times of hardship. As they had no interest in 
cooperation or job opportunities, local indigenous peoples resisted the commercial 
penetration into their environment. Their struggle finally prompted the government 
– with the support of influent politicians – to terminate the pine plantation project in 
1983. 
In 1984, when the Karnataka Pulpwood Ltd. (KPL) planted the first plot of 
eucalyptus, a conflict started with a large amount of protest letters to the 
authorities and through protest meetings at several villages in the region (Guha 
and Martínez-Alier, 1997). The EJO Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (SPS), together 
with a village organization, was at the forefront of the movement. It filed two 
lawsuits against KPL in the Supreme Court of India. SPS organized training 
camps in non-violence in a neighbouring village. Between 1987 and 1990, several 
hundreds of persons participated to three satyagraha actions where saplings of 
eucalypts were uprooted and replaced with tree species locally useful (on the third 
occasion, SPS invited the Chipko leader C.P. Bhatt). In the meantime, journalists 
sympathetic to the movement were intensifying the press campaign against KPL. 
The state government suggested to set up a commission but never did it. SPS 
lobbied the government of India to clarify its own position on KPL-style schemes. 
Under increasing pressure, the government of Karnataka finally decided in 1990 to 
wind up KPL. 
In 2007 in West Bengal, indigenous villagers chopped down around 6600 young 
eucalypts on a 6-hectare state forest department plantation (Mitra, 2008; DtE, 
2009). The residents claimed that the land is theirs and that they want it back. 
They used to grow multiple crops on this land, which, they say, provided them with 
enough food for at least 6 months a year. One activist said: “In 2001, officials 
asked for land along the fringes of our fields. Then they took our thumb 
impressions on some papers and by 2004 they took over all our land”. The 
eucalypt plantation started in 2004 as a joint forest management scheme funded 
by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. Under the scheme, every family in the 
village would receive 25% of the cash earned from selling the trees after harvests 
10 years later. But the villagers said that they cannot afford to wait that long. 
“Eucalypt doesn’t give us food”. The indigenous peoples are thus reclaiming the 
land under the provisions of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. That the act, which recognizes 
the land rights of forest communities who do not have documentary proof of 
ownership, has not been implemented yet, does not seem to faze them. The land 
in question was originally a mahal forest owned by rich landowners or local 
royalty. The West Bengal Private Forests Act, 1948, which was the state’s first 
attempt to assert control over south Bengal forests, states that the rights of forest 
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dwellers should be recorded and settled by forest settlement officers appointed for 
the purpose. However, after 1953 no survey was ever conducted and the struggle 
is still on. 
Today, from mining to hydroelectric projects, examples of private companies 
getting vast tracts of forests by paying a fraction of their project cost are abundant. 
For example, permission was granted to Vedanta Resources for mining Niyamgiri 
hills in Orissa that are the source of spiritual, cultural and economic sustenance 
for the Dongaria Kondh tribe. Vedanta had to pay a NPV of 10 million dollars and 
another 10 million for wildlifeconservation and management(Awasthi, 2008). In 
2008, the Polavaram multi-purpose hydel project in Andhra Pradesh got the 
permission to submerge mixed deciduous forest of the Eastern Ghat, including a 
large part of the Papikonda Wildlife Sanctuary. Even the CEC observed that the 
forest coming under submergence was a mature ecosystem and could not be 
compensated by any plantation (Awasthi, 2008). 
 
6.4 Final remarks on the reductionism of the Net 
Present Value 
The Supreme Court’s idea was to estimate the value of forests in order to 
compensate for their loss. To that aim, it uses an economic tool, the NPV, which 
reduces all languages of valuation to monetary costs and benefits. Even Prof. 
Kanchan Chopra seems to be aware of some of the limits involved: “a price 
cannot be put on the inviolable nature of protected areas and the biodiversity-rich 
areas like sacred groves and mangroves”, she said (quoted by P. Ghosh, 2006); 
“protected areas should not be diverted for any non-forestry use at any cost” 
(ibid.). However, for areas other than protected areas, Chopra thinks that 
monetary valuation is perfectly legitimate – an idea that will not convince many 
forest-dependant populations and other stakeholders like ecologists. In reality, the 
entire forest valuation process has to be rethought. “NPV was mandated as a tool 
for forest protection. It has rather become a way of getting more and more forest 
land for non-forest use,” Chopra said (ibid.). 
The idea that the NPV of a given forest is likely to generate an equivalent value in 
an afforestation or reforestation project is at best quite naïve. If we enter into the 
NPV calculation, we realize that determining a ‘proper’ discount rate is an 
eminently political question and that there is simply no getting around. In fact, the 
entire valuation process is a political question. What is valuable? For what social 
groups? For how long? At what degree? The use of NPV will always remain 
controversial because ecosystem valuation is a complex socio-political process 
that cannot result in a single neat monetary total. Anyone forgetting the 
incommensurability of values will get confused when it comes to ‘compensation’. 
The best example of this is to believe that tree monocultures can compensate for 
the deforestation of natural forests. Indeed, both ecosystems may have the same 
total monetary value. But this argument is unlikely to impress local forest users… 
The idea that the NPV 
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7.1 Introduction35 
This section describes an on-going environmental conflict over the prospect of 
gold mining at Mount Ida, Turkey and focuses on the valuation languages social 
actors use to either support or oppose it. Prospecting for gold has been expanding 
in the region since 2007, leading to the development of an opposition that aims to 
halt several cyanide-leaching open pit gold mining projects in an area valued for 
its environment, agricultural production and cultural heritage. While the 
government and companies try to portray the matter of environmental impacts 
solely as a technical problem that will be handled with the proper use of 
technology, we believe thatthe conflict should rather be assessed in terms of 
valuation languages so as to make it possible to better grasp the various 
dimensions of the conflict and differentiate between disagreements that can be 
controlled via bargaining over the amount of monetary compensation and those 
that cannot. 
 
 
35
   This chapter is mainly based on Avcı et al. (2010) and Avcı (2012). A combination of qualitative 
and quantitative techniques was employed to identify the valuation languages used in the area. 
The field study comprised of 37 in-depth interviews, three focus groups, and a survey administered 
to a total of 738 citizens, representative of the region’s urban and rural population. 
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The conflict takes place in a country where non-industrial mineral reserves are 
rather extensive, and the government is keen to foster foreign direct investment to 
capitalise on mining opportunities as underlined in Global Business Reports 
(2008:64 in Hurley and Arı, 2011, p. 1400): “Turkey is rapidly transforming itself 
into a viable and powerful mining nation where investors can find a multitude of 
companies, both local and foreign, operating to international standards ...the 
mining sector is proving that it could one day be the economy’s backbone.” 
Indeed, there has been a dramatic increase in mineral extraction in Turkey 
following the adoption of neoliberal economic reforms after the 1990s, with the 
promise of more economic growth. The substantial rise in mining activities in the 
country is well-linked to changes made in the Mining Law in 1985, which 
liberalised extractive sectors and encouraged the involvement of foreign 
corporations in the sector as part of the export-oriented growth strategy 
encouraged by neoliberal policies. (Arsel, 2005).Since then, on-going revisions 
have taken place in mining and environmental laws, making it quicker and easier 
for foreign companies to get exploration permits. Measures included reducing the 
time it takes to receive an exploration licence, lowering corporate taxes and 
licensing fees for landholdings, and finally easing laws related to protecting forest 
reserves and rare ecosystems (Avcı et al., 2010; Hurley and Aru, 2011; Avcı, 
2012). The corresponding reaction in civil society has mainly manifested itself as 
environmental justice movements at the local and national levels. This has also 
been the case at Mount Ida. 
 
7.2 Gold mining projects at Mount Ida 
Mount Ida, with a population of 150,000, is situated in the Biga Peninsula in north-
western Anatolia. In recognition of its biological diversity, endemic species, rich 
water resources, and cultural and archaeological significance, part of the mountain 
was declared a national park in 1993. Since the early 1990s, there have been 
intermittent exploration activities for gold and other minerals at several locations in 
the region. Companies began to increase their exploration efforts in 2004, 
following the changes in the Mining Law and the rise in international gold prices. 
Since then, two projects – Ağı Dağı and Kirazlı – previously jointly owned by 
Canadian junior companies Teck Cominco and Fronteer, which were then 
acquired by Canadian Alamos Gold in 2010,have advanced to the mine 
development stage. The initial and sustaining capital costs of the two projects are 
estimated at USD 234.6 million. The area is well-served with roads, electricity and 
transmission lines, which reduce the need for significant investments in 
infrastructure. According to its newsletter dated 28 June 2012, Alamos Gold 
expects to produce 1,001,800 ounces of gold and 1,896,700 ounces of silver over 
seven years with the Ağı Dağı Project; and 495,300 ounces of gold and 3,006,100 
ounces of silver over five years at Kirazlı. 
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The company is also exploring other areas close to Ağı Dağı and Kirazlı. There 
are a few other mining projects in the region, including TV Tower and Halilağa 
owned by Teck Cominco and Pilot Gold (formerly Fronteer), and the Kestanelik 
Project owned by Australian Chesser Resources. All three projects are currently in 
the exploration stage and the companies are reporting “exciting” initial drilling 
results.  
These projects are to the north of Mount Ida, and despite a few sporadic 
confrontations between villagers and company workers, exploration activities had 
not created much discontent until 2007. It was when another company, Global 
Mining from Turkey, arrived at a village to the south called Bahçedere in the 
summer 2007 that a region-wide conflict was triggered, which quickly became a 
prominent topic on the national public agenda. By October 2007, the issue was 
making headlines in the national media, drawing public attention to what was 
happening in the region. The particular social make-up of the region to the south, 
along the coast of Edremit Bay was the underlying reason for the strong and 
immediate response. 
 
7.3 The conflict and stakeholders involved 
In Biga, almost half of the population lives in rural areas, and the local economy 
relies primarily on agriculture and animal husbandry, related food production 
industries and forestry. In the favourable conditions of the Mediterranean climate 
with mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers, the production of high value-added 
fruits and vegetables on the irrigated plains has provided many of the villages with 
a relatively good and stable income. However, the southern part of the region that 
overlooks Edremit Bay (in the Aegean Sea) has a different social structure. The 
Map 5:  
The location of the gold 
mining project at Mount Ida 
Source: alamosgold.com 
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coast has been witness to rapid urbanisation associated with permanent and 
seasonal migration of middle and upper-middle class residents, especially retirees 
from large urban centres nearby (Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Balıkesir), who wish to 
enjoy the environmental amenities the region provides (Hurley and Arı, 2011). 
Moreover, olive oil production occupies a significant place in the economy in this 
area, and makes an important and growing contribution to Turkey’s exports. There 
are also a number of ecotourism facilities that were established to offer 
opportunities to enjoy the region’s environment (Hurley and Arı, 2011). 
 
 
It was these homeowners, olive and olive oil producers, and business owners in 
the tourism industry – many of them members and founders of local environmental 
organisations – who led the development of a broad-based opposition to gold 
mining in the region. They quickly earned the support of local governments, 
villagers, and national environmental organisations (e.g. Turkish Foundation for 
Combating Soil Erosion, Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats, 
BirdLife International’s partner in Turkey, Doğa Derneği, and Buğday Association 
for Supporting Ecological Living). Their connections to influential networks in 
urban centres – in the mediaand universitieswith intellectuals– enabled them to 
place the issue on the public agenda and put pressure on the government and 
mining companies. 
The discontents over the development of gold mining around Mount Ida were 
based on the potential impacts of open pit, cyanide-leaching gold production in an 
environment valued for its agricultural production, landscape, and historical and 
cultural importance. Such concerns gave rise to slogans such as “Mount Ida is a 
world heritage”, and “What is on top of Mount Ida is worth more than what is 
beneath it”. The cyanide-leaching method in particular is considered a major threat 
Picture 5: Protest in the 
town of Etili, June 3, 
2012  
Source: Municipality of 
Canakkale, 
http://www.canakkale.bel.t
r/bpi.asp?caid=226&cid=1
4893). 
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in this geographical setting of rich agricultural lands, fruit and olive orchards, 
pastures and forests. Opposition actors claim that one way or another, cyanide will 
seep into the environment, contaminate the water and soil, and endanger both 
public health and agricultural production. 
 
After the initial spark set in the summer of 2007, opposition groups intensified their 
struggle through various means. They organised panels and seminars in several 
towns to talk about the ecological, economic and cultural values of the region, and 
the threats posed by gold mining to those values. These meetingsbrought together 
academics from regional universities, local and regional EJOs such as the 
Çanakkale Environmental Platform, Mount Ida Conservation Initiative and 
GÜMÇED (The Keepers of the Beautiful Edremit Bay), professional organisations 
(e.g. Union of Chamber of Turkish Engineers, local Chambers of Agriculture) and 
representatives from local tourism businesses. To support the opposition groups, 
34 municipalities in the region formed the Union of Municipalities of Mount Ida and 
Madra Mountain. A petition was addressed to the then Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources to annul the exploration permits. Numerous demonstrations 
were held in several towns, the largest at downtown Çanakkale in April 2008, 
attended by close to ten thousand people. Some members of parliament from the 
opposition also took the issue to the parliament, voicing their concerns and 
demanding explanations from the government as to why gold mining was being 
promoted in such an ecologically, historically and culturally valuable region. Table 
11 presents the timeline for some major events. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 6:  
Protest in the city center of 
Canakkale, April 5, 2008 
Source: authors 
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Year Event 
1985 New mining law in Turkey liberalises extractive sectors. 
1990-2004 Sporadic exploration activities take place at several locations in the region. 
2004-2007 
Companies begin to increase exploration efforts in 2004, following changes to the Mining 
Law and the rise in international gold prices. 
2007-2008 Exploration expands to the south of the region, initiating conflict. Protests ensue. 
2009-2011 
Faced with opposition, companies back off from the southern part of the region, and 
reduce the intensity of their activities in the north for a while. The opposition partly loses 
vigour. 
2010 
Alamos Gold acquires the two most developed projects in January 2010, the pace of 
exploration and development work once more gain momentum. 
2012 
The ministry approves the EIAs for the mine pitsfor the Ağı Dağı and Kirazlı projects, 
allowing the companies to proceed with mine development.. The meetings to publicise the 
EIAs meet with protest; villagers do not allow the meeting to proceed despite the security 
forces deployed to prevent them. 
2013 
EJOs are currently preparing to initiate a legal process to annul the EIA report, and plan 
other activities to reboot the opposition. 
 
Today, local communities seem divided as some people work for the companies, 
while others consider job offers and other benefits as “bribes” to win hearts. Those 
in the first group accuse others of not thinking about the future development of 
their communities, and playing into the hands of civil society groups allegedly 
motivated by their own political ideologies rather than the protection of the 
environment or the people. The second group, on the other hand, claims that 
those who work for the companies are sacrificing the common good of the 
community to pursue their own personal interests.  
In July 2008, we administered a questionnaire in the form of face-to-face 
interviews to a random sample of 738 citizens representative of people living in 
the region aged 18 and above, to identify the positions of the general public vis-à-
vis gold mining at Mount Ida, the factors that affect their choices and the 
respective valuation languages they employed. The results indicate that 83% of 
the local population is against gold mining in the region, and that material stakes, 
values and perceptions play a significant role in differentiating between people 
who support gold mining and those who do not. 
Findings suggest that a particular group in the rural population – high income 
earning males not engaged in irrigated farming – support the project, presumably 
with the expectation of benefiting from business and employment opportunities 
gold mining may create. Although relatively small, this group seems to be powerful 
in virtue of their higher incomes. It appears that the mining companies, as they 
themselves also claim, have secured the support of this influential group at the 
local level. Value differences between supporters and opponents of gold mining 
are also significant. Supporters seem to be less concerned about environmental 
problems, have a lower sense of belonging to the local community, and are less 
politically engaged at the local level. These differences indicate that the conflict 
Table 11: 
Timeline of Major 
Events (own 
elaboration). 
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does not simply rest on material interests and that disagreements over values 
should also be acknowledged.  
 
Stakes Live in rural areas 
 Males 
 Have higher per capita income 
 Do not do irrigated farming 
Values Have lower level of belongingness 
 Less politically active at the local level 
 Less concerned about environmental problems at the national scale 
Perceptions Have higher level of trust in state institutions 
 Less concerned for environmental risks 
 Have higher level of trust in mining technology 
 Feel more knowledgeable about gold mining 
 
Findings suggest that a particular group in the rural population – high income 
earning males not engaged in irrigated farming – support the project, presumably 
with the expectation of benefiting from business and employment opportunities 
gold mining may create. Although relatively small, this group seems to be powerful 
in virtue of their higher incomes. It appears that the mining companies, as they 
themselves also claim, have secured the support of this influential group at the 
local level. Value differences between supporters and opponents of gold mining 
are also significant. Supporters seem to be less concerned about environmental 
problems, have a lower sense of belonging to the local community, and are less 
politically engaged at the local level. These differences indicate that the conflict 
does not simply rest on material interests and that disagreements over values 
should also be acknowledged.  
With regard to perceptions, project supporters seem to be less concerned about 
environmental risks, have confidence in technology in managing environmental 
impacts, and trust state institutions more. This suggests that risk politics is an 
important dimension of environmental conflicts and the level of trust in technology 
and institutions plays an important role in the way environmental impacts and risks 
are perceived (Barry, 2007; Gandy, 1999; Garvin, 2001; Smith and Marquez, 
2000). No doubt, the issues of risk, trust and knowledge are important elements in 
the valuation languages on both sides of the conflict as discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: 
Characteristics of 
those who support 
gold mining (as 
compared to 
opponents). 
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7.4 Valuation languages employed at Mount Ida 
Key arguments used by project supporters are the contributions of gold mining to 
local and national economic development – considered a must for a developing 
country like Turkey. Valuation languages employed by the opposition include 
sustaining peasant livelihood and ways of life, protecting ecological integrity and 
public health, and defending national interests versus those of foreign companies. 
 
Why for? 
 National development: The argument is that economic prosperity should not 
be sacrificed to oversensitive environmentalism. Governmental agencies 
refer to the necessity of utilising underground resources in the course of 
development, calling attention to the country’s current account deficit and 
foreign direct investment requirement. This is not surprising, as Turkey’s 
liberalisation move in the mining industry aimed to attract private and 
foreign investments, and was indeed in line with the whole process of 
modernisation evidenced throughout the history of the Republic, where the 
identification of progress with economic development led policy makers to 
prioritise economic growth over political and social transformation (Arsel, 
2005; Keyman, 2005; Adaman and Arsel, 2012). Adding to this concern, 
mining companies point to Turkey’s dependence on imports to meet input 
requirements of the domestic industry, and in particular, the traditionally 
significant jewellery sector. Both governmental agencies and mining 
companies add that necessary measures will be taken to minimise 
environmental impacts (AMD, 2008). 
 Local development: Support for gold mining at the local level, especially in 
rural areas, seems to be related to employment and business opportunities 
that are expected to accompany mining activities. Some villagers claim they 
need the mining jobs for a decent life, whereas others, particularly those not 
engaged in agriculture, argue that mining can promote the development of 
new businesses (especially transportation) and give them a chance to 
improve their standard of living. 
 
Why against? 
 Threat to environmental quality: The discourse employed by the opposition 
was based first and foremost on the distinctive properties of Mount Ida. 
Framed in terms of “environmental protection” and/or “environmental 
quality”, this particular discourse was first articulated by environmental 
NGOs and the elite, and later adopted by the local public. The use of 
cyanide, in particular, was claimed to pose unacceptable threats to the 
ecological integrity of the region – one of the mayors claiming: “Ecological 
balance has to be protected; once disturbed, you cannot bring back what is 
lost…Mount Ida is an historical and ecological whole.” 
  
 
 
Page 73 
 
 
Valuation languages used in gold mining conflict at Mound Ida, Turkey 
 Threat to livelihood/way of life: Equally important to the locals in rural areas 
was the language of community life and livelihood. Many farmers – 
particularly those engaged in irrigated farming who were proud of the 
productivity of their land and the quality of their products – argued that their 
output would be reduced and “poisoned”. Some others emphasised 
expected disturbances to their daily lives from blasting, dust, and noise. An 
aged farmer expressed his concern, with some exaggeration, saying, 
“There will be quakes because of blasting, our homes will collapse.”  
 Health risks: Cyanide use in gold mining has also been brought in the 
language of public health as the discourse on the risks that cyanide-
leaching in gold mining pose to human health has been forcefully employed. 
Furthermore, some directly referred to Article 56 of the Constitution, which 
states everyone has the “right to live in a healthy and balanced 
environment” – as one of the NGO activists said, “Gold mining is a threat to 
the lives of human beings and other living things. Maintenance of living 
spaces is at risk… The right to live in a healthy environment is universal and 
should be defended for all people at all places.” 
 Nationalistic feelings: Another language is found is the nationalistic rhetoric, 
which has always had some degree of influence on political circles and 
societal life in Turkey (see, e.g., Kancı, 2009). Here, the gold mining project 
is read as foreign companies’ exploitation of Turkey’s natural resources, 
with an analogy drawn between the Gallipoli War (when the Allied Forces 
charged Gallipoli during WWI in a futile attempt to reach Constantinople) 
and the resistance against gold mining as defence of the motherland – 
some slogans read: “They shall not pass”, “Mount Ida is our homeland, and 
it is not for sale”, “Cyanide-using companies leave our homeland”. This 
argument expresses dissatisfaction with the distribution of expected 
benefits rather than concerns about the environmental impact of gold 
mining, as made apparent in the emphasis on foreign ownership and the 
demand for higher royalty payments to the state. 
Picture 7:  
Exploration site (location not 
mentioned by the newspaper)  
Source: Radikal, November 7, 2010 
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Central to the whole debate is the question about the potential environmental 
impact of gold mining and the extent to which this can be regulated. Information 
provided by opposing NGOs and by mining companies and government agencies 
is rather dissimilar. Opponents claim that existing technology cannot cope with all 
environmental impacts of gold mining, while proponents hold the opposite view. A 
statement made by a Gold Miners Association representative is quite telling in this 
regard: “Science tells us the risks and we develop technologies to manage them. 
Once we’ve identified the risks, then, the rest is straightforward: we can easily 
control them.” Equally important has been differences in the level of trust in 
institutions between the opposition and support groups. Opposition groups fear 
that mining companies will fail to take all the necessary precautions in order to cut 
costs and the government will not enforce strict regulations. The issues of risk, 
trust and knowledge have been, in that sense, important elements in the valuation 
languages on both sides of the conflict, and seem to underlie the different 
positions vis-à-vis gold mining. 
Indeed, within the opposition groups, those who are primarily concerned with the 
impact of gold mining on their source of income and their way of life, 
environmental quality, and public health seem to meet on common ground. These 
groups can mutually support each other in their struggle against gold mining as 
their interests lie in protecting the environment. Moreover, the majority of the 
people in these groups did not change their positions when they were offered 
compensatory schemes, suggesting that their opposition cannot be allayed by 
simple measures. 
 
 
 
 
Picture 8:  
A view from one of the 
mining sites on Mount Ida 
Source: 
http://www.change.org/tr/ka
mpanyalar/kaz-
da%C4%9Flar%C4%B1nda-
maden-ocaklar%C4%B1-
istemiyoruz-
kazdaglarikazilmasin 
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7.5 Final remarks: one case out of hundreds 
The valuation languages used at Mount Ida primarily demonstrate the multi-
dimensionality of such conflicts. The articulation of multiple discourses in such 
conflicts is particularly important since governments and companies usually try to 
portray the matter of environmental impacts solely as a technical problem that will 
be handled with the proper use of technology. In a way, issues usually regarded 
merely as “technical matters” by company and government experts (such as how 
to manage cyanide use, and the extent to which the mine site can be rehabilitated) 
seem to be far from being settled for many others. 
At Mount Ida, the majority of the local population, in particular lower income 
groups, believed that the burden of this environmentally-degrading development 
project would fall on them. The relatively well-off, however, were likely to support 
the project in expectation of new business and employment opportunities. This 
result discredits the post-materialist thesis in so far as it shows that lower income 
groups actually do worry about local environmental matters, even more so than 
higher income groups and support the thesis of the environmentalism of the poor 
(Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997).  
From the perspective of corporations and the state, the local environment with its 
gold reserves is an object of capital accumulation and economic growth (Çoban, 
2004). The mining claim surely entails a value calculation that goes beyond the 
physical amount of gold available but is also linked to the speculative price 
formation in stock exchange markets when mining companies acquire and control 
new micro-territorial mining spaces (Bridge, 2004). Depending on feasibility and 
rentability assessments, companies may choose not to move ahead with some 
projects. What is certain is that they will continue their exploration and 
development work in the upcoming years. However, given the perceptions and 
concerns of the majority of the local population, the projects cannot be legitimised 
easily, since the local population’s vision of local development greatly diverges 
from that of the state. 
Some villagers at Mount Ida value their way of life and the environment more than 
gold, and point to the critical importance of symbiotic community–environment 
relationships (Çoban, 2004). Their high sense of belonging and concern for the 
local environment indicates they have more to lose than merely their incomes. 
Although it may seem that this position can be modified via compensation, this 
turned out not to be the case at Mount Ida. Offers of monetary and/or technical 
compensatory schemes – such as improved technology, restoration of the mining 
site, and monetary payments – did not suffice in satisfactorily resolving 
disagreements in the region.  
This case is, of course, exemplary– one case out of hundreds. Yet, the snapshot 
is persuasive in demonstrating the clash of incommensurable values. Given the 
differences in material interests, values and perceptions, it may be inferred that 
the evolution of the Mount Ida conflict will very much depend on the extent to 
which different valuation languages are acknowledged and addressed. This 
requires a decision-making framework which moves beyond the obsession of 
Mount Ida case 
requires a decision-
making framework 
which moves beyond 
the obsession 
of“taking nature into 
account” in money 
terms, and which is 
able therefore to cope 
with value pluralism  
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“taking nature into account” in money terms, and which is able therefore to cope 
with value pluralism (Martínez-Alier, 2003). Undoubtedly, in a society where power 
relations were more equally-distributed among actors, it would be easier to 
explicitly recognise all these different languages. Still, it is clear that the state may 
arrive at a legitimate decision only through participatory and deliberative 
mechanisms that acknowledge and address these issues. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Deciding on energy production alternatives (such as nuclear power, renewables, 
fossil fuels and so on) is a difficult task due to the multi-faceted characteristics of 
the problem. To assess the alternatives, their costs and benefits in social, 
environmental and economic terms need to be analysed in detail and compared. 
In current policy practices, however, the problem is often reduced to the economic 
sphere, where a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is used to assess and compare the 
alternatives by calculating net benefits
36
 in monetary terms (Hanley and Barbier, 
2009).
37
 This is not easy, because not all environmental and social costs and 
benefits are reflected in monetary units; yet CBAs require everything to be 
converted into monetary terms. Given that values are not always commensurable, 
this is quite problematic (O’Neill, 1993; Munda, 2004; Aldred, 2006).
38
 This 
 
 
36
   i.e., the difference between total benefits and total costs. 
37
   A cost-benefit analysis with multiple alternatives is run by calculating the costs and benefits of each 
alternative, and choosing the one with the highest net benefit. In selecting an energy production 
method, however, the problem is often reduced to choosing the alternative with the lowest cost 
(cost effectiveness analysis), because high energy demands causes the benefits of electricity 
production to be very high.  
38
   Values are incommensurable when they cannot be precisely measured along some common 
cardinal scale of units of value, for instance, money in this case (Munda, 2004; Aldred, 2006). 
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chapter will focus on difficulties faced in assessments of energy production 
alternatives, particularly in the valuation of nuclear energy production. 
In general, cost-benefit calculations include impacts that are relatively easy to 
calculate and directly visible in terms of money (such as construction costs, 
operation and maintenance costs, benefits from lower electricity prices, etc.). 
Other indirect non-monetary impacts on nature and human health are also 
included, by converting them into monetary units (Hanley and Barbier, 2009). 
However, many non-monetary impacts are not immediately observed and require 
a prediction of future events, or are observed/known but impossible to calculate 
with certainty, and therefore are not included in CBAs. There are also cases 
where such impacts are completely unknown and (unintentionally) kept out of 
analyses, though they continue to occur and are actually shouldered by someone 
or other, over space or time. 
In the case of nuclear energy production, the following problems arise in cost-
benefit calculations:  
 Impacts on the environment and human health: While various valuation 
methods (such as contingent valuation, travel cost method, choice 
experiment, etc.) are used to elicit values and calculate the cost of such 
impacts, their efficacy is highly debated (see for instance Knetsch, 1994; 
Spash, 2000a, 2000b; Vatn, 2004). Since these methods usually elicit only 
a partial value, an important part of occurred costs is unaccounted for and 
shifts onto nature and people. 
 Waste management costs: Nuclear waste has a considerably long life and 
may burden future generations for millions of years. Furthermore, secure 
disposal of nuclear wastes is still not clear-cut issue. While calculating the 
total present costs of a nuclear power plant in a CBA analysis, these future 
costs are discounted to the present by a social discount rate, a process 
often justified by CBA proponents through arguments such as pure-time 
preferences and social opportunity costs (O’Neill, 1993). However, the 
present value of long term costs becomes negligible when discounting over 
very long periods of time (Rabl, 1996).
39
 As O’Neill (1993, p. 48) posits, 
“[s]ocial discounting appears then to provide a rationale for displacing 
environmental damage into the future”; hence there is an important 
intergenerational equity problem. 
 Accident risk: Potential future undesirable events may be dealt with through 
accident insurance schemes (involving the payment of a premium) to 
compensate for any damages. However, nuclear accidents are different 
from ordinary accidents in the sense that they are low probability, high 
consequence (LPHC) events. This means that while the probability of 
nuclear accidents may be very low, once they occur, they will have 
 
 
39
   At any social discount rate larger than zero, the present value of a future cost or benefit is almost 
equal to zero after a long period of time (100 years). 
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catastrophic and irreversible impacts. Hence, nuclear accidents cannot be 
dealt with ordinary insurance schemes. Damages from such events may be 
so high that even governments may fail compensate for all the damage 
(Lempert, 2009).  
Although accident risk is always considered miniscule, the world has already 
witnessed three major nuclear tragedies: The partial meltdown at Three Mile 
Island (1979), the much more catastrophic Chernobyl disaster (1986) and the 
most recent accident in Fukushima (2011). Fukushima was the last straw for many 
countries such as Germany, the U.K., the U.S. and Japan, which have begun to 
either shut down their plants or freeze investments in new projects. Nonetheless, 
the enthusiasm for future plants has not faded in many other countries, despite the 
recent catastrophe. The majority of new constructions are in China, India and 
Russia (New Scientist, 2013) and the new market for nuclear power plants (NPP) 
seems to be developing countries in the near east and Eastern Europe. Russia in 
particular is a very important player and wants to build two new plants: the Belene 
NPP in Bulgaria, and the Akkuyu NPP in Turkey. Both NPPs have a long history of 
conflict.  
This chapter aims at outlining the difficulties in the valuation/evaluation of NPPs by 
using the two conflicted cases of Akkuyu and Belene, and is organised as follows: 
The following two sections will present Belene and Akkuyu NPPs respectively, 
from an historical perspective. The fourth section will look at the similarities of 
these cases from a valuation perspective. The final section will conclude with 
some theoretical and practical lessons for environmental justice organisations 
(EJOs), scientists, and policymakers. 
 
8.2 The Belene NPP in Bulgaria 
The story of the Belene NPP starts in 1981, during the socialist regime. The 
Bulgarian government decided to build a second NPP (after Kozloduy NPP) near 
Belene, by the Danube River. Construction and site preparation began in the late 
1980s, right after the Chernobyl accident, but the project was cancelled in 1991 
due to the counterarguments in the White Report prepared by the Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences (mainly, related to seismic risk and lack of economic 
viability) and strong public opposition. The government then claimed that the 
project was actually cancelled due to financial reasons(Vassilev, 2012; Todorov 
and Petrova, 2012). 
In 2003, the project was revived after the necessary decommissioning of the 
Kozloduy NPP to guarantee the energy security of the state (BNR, 2013). It was 
planned to build the new project on the remnants of the early construction, 
consisting of two units with a total capacity of 2000 MW. Given the 
recommendation in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report (2006), 
the only technology applicable to the old site would be the Russian WWER-1000, 
Atomstroyexport (a subsidiary of the Russian Rosatom), which was contracted 
after a controversial tender procedure. 
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A strong opposition formed after the revival of the project. Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) such as the Foundation for Environment and Agriculture 
(FEA), Za Zemiata, Ekoglasnost, Green Policy Institute, Zelenite (The Greens), 
and many other international anti-nuclear groups such as Greenpeace, Friends of 
the Earth, Bankwatch, European Greens, Urgewald, Campagna per la Riforma 
della Banca Mondiale gathered forces. The campaign was carried out at the local, 
national and international levels, and the NGOs formed the “No to BeleNE” (or just 
BeleNE!) coalition with more than 17 organisations. The international coalition was 
quite successful in preventing foreign banks and potential investors from financing 
the project (Todorov and Petrova, 2012). 
The initial price articulated by Atomstroyexport was EUR 4 billion. However, it 
went up to EUR 6 billion in 2009. In 2011, the Bulgarian government assigned 
HSBC to analyse the project’s economic viability. According to the appraisal by 
HSBC, the actual price of the project was estimated at EUR 10.3 billion, even 
without considering the possible environmental impacts. Not being able to secure 
the financing of the project from international banks over the years, the Bulgarian 
government cancelled the project in 2012. However, the Socialists opposition 
contested that decision, claiming that the country had already invested too much 
in the project to abandon it, and they secured 770,000 signatures (more than the 
necessary 500,000) obliging the government to seek a referendum (Balkan 
Insight, 2012) – the first referendum in democratic, post-socialist Bulgaria. 
 
 
 
 
Map 6: 
The location of 
Belene NPP and 
Kozloduy NPP. 
Source: own 
elaboration 
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Year Event 
1981 
After initial research and analyses, the Bulgarian government decides to build six nuclear units (four units of 1000 MW 
each are planned with a further two optional) by the Danube River and initiates the "Belene NPP" project.  
1987-1990  Construction work on Belene-1 is completed with 80 per cent of the equipment delivered on site. 
1990 
The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences publishes the “White Report”, which argues in detail against construction of the 
NPP, pointing to seismic risks and a lack of economic viability. The Bulgarian government suspends the project 
indefinitely one year later, due to funding problems. 
2002 
The early decommissioning of Units 1-4 of Kozloduy NPP in 2002 (1-2) and 2006 (3-4), coupled with aging coal-fired 
power plants, brings up the issue of constructing a new power plant compliant with up-to-date environmental 
requirements. 
2003 
The project is revived 12 years later. The government decides to re-start the Belene Project with total capacity of 2000 
megawatts (two new reactor blocks). Energy Minister Milko Kovachev plays a large role in re-starting the project. 
2003-2004  
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is conducted on the Belene NPP project. The report is discussed in public 
in both Bulgaria (four times) and Romania (once). Bulgarian and Romanian NGOs, as well as international organisations 
(the BeleNE! coalition, Ekoglasnost / FoE Bulgaria, Greenpeace and WISE CEE Bankwatch Network, EEB) heavily 
criticise the quality and conclusions of the EIA report, claiming that it failed to properly address seismic conditions, 
heavy accidents and environmental impacts. Despite the protests, the Bulgarian Ministry of Environment approves the 
EIA report in November 2004. The EIA report covers eight types of nuclear installations on the basis of the technical and 
economic data provided by Atomstroyexport. Its summary ascertains that the optimal choice would be either VVER-
1000/B-320 or VVER-1000/B-466 reactors. 
2005 
The government gives a final green light to the construction of Belene NPP in June, with total rated capacity of 2000 
MW. The project is supposed to deliver electricity for under €0.04/kWh and estimated to need between €2.5 and 4 billion 
in investments. 
31 Oct 2006  
Russian company Atomstroyexport wins the tender for construction for €3,997 billion, with the pre-condition to use the 
old equipment at the Belene site. Later it becomes clear that the old equipment is no longer viable – a fact that experts 
had already claimed before the so-called “tender process”. 
Dec 2006  
Bulgaria closes reactors 3 and 4 of the Kozloduy NPP, as agreed in the EU accession treaty. These are VVER 440/230 
type reactors and not considered upgradeable to a satisfactory safety level.  
July 2008  The Bulgarian Ministry of Regional Development gives Atomstroyexport a construction permit.  
Sept 2008 The construction of the Belene NPP officially begins.  
Feb 2009  
Russian company Atomstroyexport announces that it wants to recalculate the price of the project according to the 
Russian inflation index of 13.3 per cent for 2008, and officially offers a price of €6 billion, arguing that most of the 
equipment is made in Russia. 
March 2009 
Protests in 60 towns in Germany are held over RWE’s participation in the Belene project. RWE is also criticised for its 
investments in Belene during its take-over of Dutch utility Essent. 
Aug 2009  Minister of the Economy and Energy announces that the project will cost €10 billion.  
5 Oct 2009 
Standard and Poor’s downgrades NEK’s (National Electricity Company) credit rating from BB to BB minus because of its 
participation in Belene. Two weeks later, German utility RWE abandons plans to participate in the project. 
April 2011  
The Bulgarian government signs a consulting contract with U.K.-based company HSBC for a financial analysis of the 
project to construct the Belene NPP. HSBC estimates a total construction cost of €10.35 billion – not including uncertain 
effects on humans and the environment. 
22 July 
2011 
Russian Atomstroyexport launches a lawsuit against the Bulgarian National Electric Company (NEK) demanding 
payment of €58 million in arrears for its work on the construction of the Belene NPP. 
25 Oct2011  
Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) announces that British bank HSBC, consultant of the Belene nuclear project, began 
working on an assignment to attract financing by Russian Rosatom. 
Jan 2012  
After the Fukushima nuclear meltdown, Belene NPP’s project company decides to initiate a ‘stress-test’ to promote its 
stability and safety measures. The Bulgarian Nuclear Energy regulator announces that both Kozloduy and Belene NPP 
have successfully passed stress tests, in January 2012. This is the only ‘stress-test’ in the world administered to a non-
existent nuclear power plant. The process of the ‘stress tests’ is not transparent, letters sent by NGOs receive no 
replies, no public consultations are held. 
Jan 2012  Prime Minister Borisov states that fate of NPP Belene will be revealed by the end of January 2012. 
March 2012 
The Belene NPP project is officially cancelled by the government. The prime minister promises to build a gas power 
plant instead. The Socialists in opposition accuse him of treason and of ruining the Bulgarian energy industry. They 
demand a referendum. Surprisingly, Russia does not seem offended by that decision. Moscow promises not to sue 
Bulgaria and even announces it will sell natural gas to Bulgaria with an 11 per cent discount. 
April 2012 
An inspection from the State Financial Agency reports that all agreements between NEK and Atomstroyexport, as well 
as the transferred payments of over €810 million were done in violation of the Public Procurement Law.  
27 Jan 
2013 
The referendum results with 61 per cent in favour of construction and 38 per cent against. However, only about 
1,500,000 people vote (20.2% of the last parliamentary elections’ turnout), which was below the required 4,350,000 to 
make the vote valid. Hence once again, the final decision is left up to parliament.  
27 Feb 
2013 
One month later, in February 27, parliament decides to end the Belene project. However, since the referendum outcome 
was in favour of the NPP, it is decided to extend the life of reactors 5 and 6 at the Kozloduy NPP and initiate the 
construction of a new reactor at the Kozloduy site.  
 Table 13: Timeline of the Belene NPP (sources: Vassilev, 2012; Todorov and Petrova, 2012; Todorov and 
Slavov, 2013). 
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The referendum was not free of political manipulations and views that opposed 
nuclear energy were mostly muted by the mainstream media (Stanchev, 2012; 
Todorov and Slavov, 2013).While pro-nuclear arguments such as “nuclear power 
is the cheapest source” and “renewables are expensive” were covered widely 
(Stanchev, 2012), opposing views were limited due to high publicity fees charged 
by the mass media. To overcome this problem, EJOLT partner Za Zemiata joined 
forces with the “Green Alternatives” and prepared 15,000 leaflets that argued 
against nuclear power on the basis of the cost-benefit analysis conducted by Za 
Zemiata with support from the EJOLT scientific team (Todorov and Slavov, 2013). 
The idea was to draw attention to the high economic costs of the project, to which 
the public was most sensitive, and show that it was not advantageous even in 
economic terms.  
In the referendum held on 27 January 2013, citizens were asked “Should we 
develop the nuclear energy sector in the Republic of Bulgaria by constructing a 
new nuclear power plant?” Framed this way, the question invited speculative 
interpretations for both positive and negative responses (Todorov and Slavov, 
2013). Indeed, the results did little to solve the problem and instead, rendered it 
more problematic and open to speculation with both parties claiming victories. Of 
the citizens who took part in the referendum, 61 per cent voted yes and 38 per 
cent voted no, but participation rate was only 20 per cent, which was way below 
the necessary threshold. Hence, the final decision once again remained in the 
hands of the parliament. The pro-nuclear Socialist opposition party claimed that 
the results clearly showed support for the Belene NPP. Conversely, the 
government argued that 80 per cent of the population abstained from voting, and 
said this obviously reflected people’s unwillingness for a new NPP. One month 
later, on February 27, parliament reached a decision to end the Belene project. 
However, since most votes were positive, it was also decided to extend the lives 
of units 5 and 6 in Kozloduy, and begin constructing a new generation 3+ reactor 
(unit 7) on that site.  
Interpreting the parliamentary decision is difficult. Whether the Belene story has 
really come to an end remains unclear. Especially after the recent resignation of 
the prime minister (after mass protests against high electricity prices), the 
opposition party is quite confident that the future government will restart the 
project. After all, as the decisions about continuing investment in Kozloduy 
illustrate, the Bulgarian government does not seem to be against nuclear power, 
but only had cold feet for the Belene project mainly because of high construction 
costs that exceeded the capabilities of the state budget. It seems safe to venture 
that had the government secured funds from an international investor, it would not 
have wanted to end the project. Hence, there are two important factors that 
facilitated the project’s rejection:  
 HSBC’s independent report on the project’s economic viability: Although it 
was quite incomplete and excluded some important environmental impacts, 
the report was still central in reversing the views of the government and 
other potential investors against the project. This demonstrates just how 
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crucial valuation/evaluation methods are when making such important 
decisions. 
 Successful lobbying activities and protests: The international coalition of 
NGOs put effective pressure on the international banks and investors, who 
withdraw their financial support. This illustrates the significant impact 
national NGOs can have through networking at an international level. 
Today, the danger remains that political parties will abuse the public’s recent 
sensitivity to high energy prices and continue to push the myth that nuclear energy 
is a cheap source of electricity (Todorov and Slavov, 2013). Experts state that the 
contract between the Bulgarian state and Atomstroyexport (having already 
manufactured part of the equipment in Belene) will continue to pose problems, 
and the legal proceedings initiated by the Russians against Bulgaria at the High 
Court of Arbitration in Genevawill remind the public about this controversial project 
(BNR, 2013).  
 
8.3 The Akkuyu NPP in Turkey 
Turkey does not have any nuclear power plants, but it interestingly has a long 
history concerning nuclear energy. The story starts with Turkey’s involvement in 
the “Atom for Peace” initiative in 1955. About a decade later, NPPs were first 
mentioned in Turkey’s Five-Year Development Plan in 1968. Later, Akkuyu, a 
small bay on the eastern Mediterranean coast, was selected for the construction 
of Turkey’s first NPP for the following reasons: i) Akkuyu is seismically stable
40
; ii) 
it is well-situated to bring in heavy machinery by sea; iii) its low population density 
makes it safer in the unlikely event of an accident; iv) adequate cooling water is 
available at the site; and v) it is close to major electricity-hungry cities such as İçel, 
Adana, and Antalya (Akçay, 2009). The site license was acquired in 1976 and first 
attempts began in 1977. 
The first project involved the construction of a 600 MW reactor, to be built by 
Swedish company Asea Atom (today Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB). It failed, 
however, because the Swedish government withdrew its credit guarantee in 1980 
following opposition from national and Swedish civil society groups (Adalıoğlu, 
2009). Although the project was cancelled, the initial desire for nuclear power in 
Turkey was still intact. This first effort was followed by many other big and small 
attempts in the last 40 years, and almost all governments had nuclear energy on 
their agenda (Şahin, 2011). 
 
 
 
40
   Back when decisions were being made about the first site selection, Akkuyu was considered safe 
in terms of earthquake risk. However, this was disputed in the early 2000s, and scientists now 
claim that the site is actually in a seismic zone, on the Ecemiş fault line. 
Today, the danger 
remains that political 
parties will abuse the 
public’s recent 
sensitivity and 
continue to push the 
myth that nuclear 
energy is a cheap 
source of electricity 
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The second serious attempt was launched in 1982, two years after the military 
coup. Following negotiations with Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), 
Siemens-Kraft Werk Union (KWU) and General Electric (GE), an agreement was 
reached in 1984, but this effort also failed due to financial reasons and price 
disagreements (Adalıoğlu, 2009). 
Nuclear energy remained on the governmental agenda, however, and a third 
attempt was made to construct the plant in the early 1990s. The project consisted 
of building a 2,800 MW plant, and a tender organised in 1996 was attended by 
AECL, Siemens-Framatom, and Westinghouse (Adalıoğlu, 2009). Public reaction 
against the project was very strong, mainly because of what happened in 
Chernobyl
41
. A nationwide movement formed with the participation of over one 
hundred NGOs, including labour unions, political parties, ecologist initiatives, 
professional organisations, intellectuals, journalists and others. Called “The Anti-
Nuclear Platform”
42
,the coalition – which still exists today – created a strong 
opposition movement through demonstrations, legal cases, direct actions, 
conferences, etc. This attempt also failed, when the tender was cancelled due to 
rumoured corruption, strong opposition by the anti-nuclear movement (Şahin, 
2011) and various financial problems. Some claim that the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) was largely influential in the cancellation decision because of the 
economic crisis (Akçay, 2009). However, the then prime minister, Mr Ecevit, 
clearly stated that the project would be back on the agenda “[o]nce the stability 
programme has reached its aims” (Akçay, 2009, p. 351).  
 
 
41
  Right after the Chernobyl accident, authorities denied any radioactive fallout in Turkey, especially in 
the Black Sea region (known for tea and hazelnut production). In later years, the scientific evidence 
showed that the area and hence the crops were in fact contaminated. Consequently, the incidence 
of cancer cases increased in the region. This incident cause a severe decline in the public trust 
towards government authorities in the management of nuclear energy (Şahin, 2011; Ertör-Akyazı, 
et al. 2012). 
42
   http://www.nukleerkarsitiplatform.org/index.html 
Map 7: 
The location of 
Akkuyu NPP.  
Source: Own 
elaboration.  
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The last (and on-going) attempt started in 2002 with the conservative, neo-liberal 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government
43
. Numerous obstacles 
followed, such as cancellation of nuclear legislation by the High Court, various 
legislative and administrative difficulties, court cases, and a failed tender in 2009. 
Six companies were meant to participate in the tender, but only Atomstroyexport 
showed any real interest, the others stepping aside since the project seemed not 
profitable. Eventually, Atomstroyexport’s bid was accepted by the government. 
However, this decision was cancelled by the High Court for not complying with 
tender laws. In a shrewd move, the AKP government decided to continue the 
project directly with Russia by signing a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in 
2010, which was immune to legislative “chaos” (Şahin, 2011). 
According to the agreement between Russia and Turkey, Rosatom – the Russian 
state-owned corporation – will construct and run the Akkuyu NPP. Turkey will 
provide the site and necessary permits, but exercise almost no power over its 
construction, operations or waste disposal methods. Turkey also avoids a large 
portion of potential future costs and risks, by giving the higher share of the plant to 
Rosatom, which will never be less than 51 per cent. Ultimately, Akkuyu will be the 
first NPP on a state’s sovereign land, owned and operated by another state 
(Şahin, 2011). In a way, Turkey sub-contracts the costly construction, operation 
(by Russian engineers), fuel provision (from Russia) and waste disposal (into 
Russia) matters to Rosatom, with all the risks borne (and compensation 
guaranteed) by the state of Russia. Obviously, it is not possible to talk about 
technology transfer or energy independence. Under these conditions, Turkey is 
giving the purchase guarantee with a fixed price of EUR cent 12.35/kWh during 
the first 15 years, which according to the Center of Economics and Foreign Policy 
Studies report (EDAM, 2011) is cheaper than the other alternatives.  
The construction of the plant was supposed to start in 2013, but has been delayed 
due to administrative difficulties. According to the latest statement by Rosatom, 
the project will proceed in 2015 not experiencing any further delays in energy 
production, projected to begin by 2020 (Yeşil Gazete, 2013).  
A study by Ertör-Akyazı et al. (2012) shows that, even before the Fukushima 
accident, there was strong popular anti-nuclear sentiments –an opposition of 62.5 
percent to nuclear power whereas only 7.2 percent endorsement. However, these 
views and in many cases local and national protests by activists have been 
completely ignored by the Turkish government who tries to impose a particular 
view and value system regarding the environment, without meaningful public 
deliberation (Ertör-Akyazı et al., 2012). Despite all these, the Anti-Nuclear 
Platform still continues its strong, vocal opposition. 
 
 
 
43
   The AKP government has an aggressive economic development/growth agenda that does not 
prioritise any social or environmental concerns. An important component of this agenda is energy 
investments through the liberalisation of energy markets, fossil fuel plants, and hydropower plants, 
all of which currently face strong public opposition in Turkey, as of 2013.  
Ultimately, Akkuyu 
will be the first NPP 
on a state’s sovereign 
land, owned and 
operated by another 
state 
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Table 14:  
Timeline of the 
Akkuyu NPP  
Source: Adalıoğlu, 
2009; Şahin 2011; 
Akçay, 2009, Yeşil 
Gazete, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Year Event 
1968 First mention of nuclear power plants in Turkey’s Five-Year Development Plan. 
1972 The Nuclear Plants Department is founded within the Turkish Electricity Administration (TEK). 
1973 The first nuclear reactor prototype is planned and the search for a suitable plant site began. 
1976 
Akkuyu, 80 km west of Silifke on the eastern Mediterranean coast is chosen as the site and a 
site licence is obtained. 
1977 - 
1980 
The first full-scale project for Akkuyu starts under the administration of the centre-left 
Republican People’s Party (CHP). A tender is organised, where Swedish company Asea 
Atom (today Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB) is the only firm to make a bid for BWR type 
reactors. The firm is chosen to deliver the power plant, but fails due to several reasons, 
including the presence of a new, mostly local Turkish anti-nuclear movement, and opposition 
by Swedish civil society groups. The Swedish government withdraws its credit guarantee in 
1980 and the project is cancelled. 
1982 - 
1984 
After a two-year pause in the project due to the 1980 military coup, the military administration 
initiates a second attempt for Akkuyu in 1982. After negotiations with Atomic Energy of 
Canada Limited (AECL), Siemens-Kraft Werk Union (KWU) and General Electric (GE) in 
1983, an agreement is reached in 1984.  
1986 
The second attempt also fails due to disagreements between the government and the 
construction consortium on electricity prices.  
1992 A rather long-term third attempt starts in 1992 by a right-left coalition government. 
1996 
A tender is held in in October for a 2,800 MW project, prepared with consultancy from South 
Korean firm KAERI. This project triggers the largest and most visible reaction in the history of 
the anti-nuclear movement in Turkey. AECL, Siemens-Framatom, and Westinghouse 
participate in the tender. 
1997 - 
2000 
The tender deadline is postponed six times in four years due to technical and economic 
reasons, and sometimes because of intense opposition. This landmark victory of the anti-
nuclear movement in July 2000, follows popular rumours about corruption in the tender 
process. The process is cancelled and once again, the third attempt fails.  
2002 
The first AKP (Justice and Development Party) government comes to power in late 2002. This 
conservative (or moderate Islamist) and neo-liberal one-party government launches an 
economic development programme without heeding any environmental concerns, particularly 
in its second term after 2007. 
2004 
The AKP government revives the nuclear project. Akkuyu is the first option, but Sinop, a small 
Black Sea city, becomes the target for a second plant. 
2004 - 
2009 
The first years witness a number of unsuccessful attempts for Akkuyu, including nuclear 
legislation that was cancelled by the High Court in 2009, and a failed tender: While six 
companies intend to participate, only one – Atomsroyexport of Russia, which is a part of 
Rosatom – makes an offer, probably because the outcome does not seem profitable enough. 
The tender eventually is cancelled by the High Court. 
2010 
After the failure of the 2009 tender, the government decides to carry out the Akkuyu project 
directly with Russia, the only country to show enthusiasm during the tender. The governments 
of Turkey and Russia sign a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in 2010, ignoring the 
huge public reaction against it. The agreement is ratified in the Turkish Parliament in July 
2010. Being an intergovernmental agreement, the opposition cannot seek recourse at the 
courts.  
2013 
Although construction is set to start in 2013, strong opposition and administrative processes 
cause delays. The Fukushima accident seems not to affect the pro-nuclear stance of the AKP 
government. According to the latest statement by Rosatom, construction is postponed to 
begin in 2015.  
2020 Planned date for electricity production, despite the delays in starting construction. 
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8.4 Twin cases: similar aspects 
The cases of both Belene and Akkuyu are good examples illustrating the struggle 
between national/international anti-nuclear movements and governments. Marked 
by a long history of failed construction attempts, the main reason for these failures 
are financial constraints (lack of international funds) and strong civil society 
opposition.  
The construction of nuclear plants often comes to a halt because high amounts of 
initial investments are required. Neither the Bulgarian nor the Turkish 
governments have been able to secure the necessary initial financing as of yet. 
This is mainly because in the developed world (where the required capital lies), 
faith in nuclear is not as strong as it used to be, due to several accidents and 
strong international opposition. Presently, both projects have ended up with 
Russian Rosatom (and its subsidiaries) as their financier, who appears to be 
extremely enthusiastic about entering new/developing energy markets. It is 
obvious that the “energy independency” argument often attributed to nuclear 
energy is not true for these two cases, since both countries will continue to 
depend on Russia (which already meets their current energy needs in terms of 
natural gas). 
 
Box 2: Some similarities between the Belene and Akkuyu projects 
 Developmentalist arguments: Both cases are marked with similar “we need nuclear energy 
for economic growth” types of arguments. Especially for Turkey, the plant signifies a 
milestone in modernisation.  
 Energy dependency arguments: Both the Turkish and the Bulgarian governments argue 
that high capacity nuclear plants will reduce their energy dependency. However, because 
the enriched uranium will come from Russia in both cases, there is actually no room for 
improvement. It might even be said that Turkey will become all the more energy-
dependent.  
 Seismic zone: According to plans, both projects will be constructed close to active fault 
lines. Although both governments argue that the plants will be built with state-of-the-art 
technology and be earthquake-ready, even the latest technologies have been known to 
fail, Fukushima being a very specific case in point.  
 Rosatom: The Russian nuclear energy state corporation has quite a bad transparency 
record and is involved in both projects (among others in Middle East, North Africa and the 
Balkans – the firm operates in more than 40 countries). 
 Technical design: Both projects are going to use WWER type (2x1000MW in Belene and 
4x1200MW in Turkey), Russian made reactors – a previously untested design – which 
both governments use in their “the latest technology” arguments. 
 Non-transparent procedures: Both cases witnessed failed and manipulated tenders that 
favoured one party, and badly conducted EIAs that endorsed nuclear energy. In both 
cases, the conducted EIAs received harsh (and well-deserved) criticism for not analysing 
the full nuclear fuel chain, including mining, upgrading and fuel production, and fuel and 
waste transport. They also did not include a proper analysis of alternative methods such 
as wind or solar energy.  
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Through the years, the governments of both countries tried to trounce civil 
opposition movements through non-transparent procedures, by hiding crucial 
information about financing and construction plans. Turkey surpassed the 
legislative processes through an intergovernmental agreement, hence further 
reducing the transparency of the decision-making process. The Bulgarian 
government has abandoned the Belene NPP for the time being, following HSBC’s 
cost estimations for construction and operation. While the HSBC report helped the 
(temporary) abandonment of the Belene project, the Bulgarian government does 
not seem to be categorically against nuclear energy: it has decided to build 
another reactor unit at Kozloduy (which will cost less only in terms of construction 
since most of the infrastructure is already there), illustrating its continued interest 
in the nuclear sector. For the Akkuyu project, neither the state nor independent 
agencies have conducted (or published) any economic-viability reports. It is 
unlikely that the Turkish government is unaware of the risks and uncertainties 
related to the nuclear plant, but Turkey’s final move to cope with such uncertainty 
and unknown costs has been to shift them on Russia by an agreement similar to 
sub-contracting. 
In their campaign against nuclear power during the referendum process, Za 
Zemiata chose to run a CBA to be able to develop counterarguments. The 
problem is that cost-effectiveness (or cost-benefit) analyses are unable to cover 
many important issues as the real value of nature, value plurality involved in such 
cases, and especially the uncertainty and ignorance that is crucial in the case of 
nuclear energy. Za Zemiata’s strategy to choose a CBA was rather a strategic 
decision, which was still effective since they were able to show that the project 
was not profitable, even without taking its social and environmental costs into 
account. Yet such strategy would not be advantageous if the NPP was indeed 
profitable economically. 
 
8.5 Comments and conclusion 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) seems to be a quite simple and straightforward 
decision-aiding tool commonly used in policy-making. However, the complexity of 
current policy problems (such as nuclear energy) needs to be addressed with a 
multidimensional framework. In many instances, CBAs are not useful since they 
reduce the problem to the economic dimension only, often disregarding 
environmental and social issues (Rietveld and Ouwersloot, 1992; Munda, 2004). 
CBA fails to properly address important aspects of decision-making regarding 
nuclear energy such as impacts on environment and health, waste management, 
and nuclear accidents. These aspects are associated with ecological complexity, 
uncertainty, and irreversibility. As Ravetz (2004) argues, in such cases, the 
assumption that science can construct “facts” is not quite true, since as also put 
forward by Latour and Woolgar (1986), ‘scientific facts’ cannot be isolated from 
values and interests. Various actors (such as power utilities, governments, current 
and future consumers, local communities and so on) with various interests are 
involved in such policy problems. Hence, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1994) propose 
CBA fails to properly 
address important 
aspects of decision-
making regarding 
nuclear energy such 
as impacts on 
environment and 
health, waste 
management, and 
nuclear accidents. 
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that the policymaking process in such cases should actually be a “dialogue” 
between all stakeholders, through the democratisation of knowledge that extends 
to the peer community. 
The CBA employs the potential Pareto improvement criterion, the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation test. According to this criterion, a proposal is “Pareto efficient” if 
gains are greater than losses, so that gaining parties are able to compensate the 
losers for their losses caused by project implementation (O’Neill, 1993). However, 
in the case of nuclear energy, the losses incurred by some stakeholders cannot be 
fully compensated since many damages (especially those after the nuclear 
accidents) are irreversible. There is a need to change the compensation principle 
(lying at the centre of the welfare perception of the CBA) for the precautionary 
principle (Munda, 2004), which often requires abandoning projects that may have 
irreversible, unknown, and uncertain impacts on stakeholders and nature.  
On this background, it is clear that the proper method for assessing nuclear 
energy production should: 
 be able to incorporate the evaluation of multiple alternatives, 
 be able to address the multiplicity of dimensions, 
 avoid reductionism by addressing incommensurability and ecological 
complexity, and 
 be open to stakeholder participation and hence be transparent. 
Cases like these call for a set of tools and an analytical framework that address 
multiplicity in a non-reductionist manner and with a process of stakeholder 
participation. Multi-criteria evaluation techniques provide such a set of tools that 
give structure to problem formulation, address multiple dimensions, enhance 
transparency and facilitate participation (Munda et al., 1994; Stagl, 2006). There 
exists many participatory multi-criteria methods (such as Social Multi-Criteria 
Evaluation [SMCE], Multi-Criteria Mapping [MCM] and Integraal)
44
 that are able to 
address all these issues, and should replace cost-benefit (or cost-effectiveness) 
analyses in policymaking practices.  
Of course, multi-criteria methods are not yet perfect tools to be applied to 
decision-making cases either, since:  
 Conducting them still requires expert guidance through the process. That is 
why, as seen in the Belene case, activists may still choose to run a CBA, 
which is more established than MCE methods. 
 End-users still perceive multi-criteria models as being quite complicated 
(Gamboa, 2008) and results obtained by MCE models are not as easily 
communicated as the simple monetary result of a CBA.  
 
 
44
   For more information, see Gerber et al. (2013) EJOLT Report No. 8: 
http://www.ejolt.org/2013/02/guide-to-multicriteria-evaluation-for-environmental-justice-
organisations/  
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 In many cases, it is difficult to gather all stakeholders together as some 
social movements may be unwilling to participate in such processes due to 
distrust in governments (Gamboa, 2008), or governments/decision-makers 
may not care about the arguments of the social movements and choose not 
to employ participatory procedures.  
In the light of these issues, further action should be taken to make MCE methods 
accessible to communities in a way that meets the needs of the end-users 
(particularly EJOs and government agencies), and promote them more to help 
both activists and decision-makers trust the usefulness of MCE methods. 
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9.1 Introduction 
In all their diversity, each one of these case studies from four continents deals with 
how to adequately take a decision about a given ‘development project’ and/or how 
to ‘compensate’ for the socio-environmental destruction involved. Two chapters 
are concerned with socio-environmental impact assessments (oil spills in Nigeria 
and river diverting in Brazil), two others tackle cost/benefit approaches and their 
limits (forest NPV in India and nuclear plants in Bulgaria and Turkey), one 
criticizes a particular multicriteria evaluation exercise (‘leave oil in the soil’ in 
Ecuador), and one analyses a conflict of valuation languages (gold mining in 
Turkey). Among these case studies, two (Nigeria and India) also tackle the 
compensatory mechanisms involved as well as their appropriateness (see Table 
15). 
Regarding valuation issues, is there any ‘best practice’ for EJOs that emerges? In 
fact, none of the chapters offers a successful ‘model’ to be generally applied. 
Quite the opposite, each case study highlights severe flaws in the assessment of 
the ‘development projects’ at stake. In Nigeria, fairly reliable data on the socio-
environmental impacts are only available for a small portion of the delta 
(Ogoniland). In Ecuador, no convincing evaluation method has been applied to 
date. In Brazil, the environmental impact assessment does not take into account 
distributive and equity issues. In India, the compensation method for forest losses 
is blatantly reductionist in scope. In Turkey and Bulgaria, cost/benefit analyses at 
best provide a temporary brake on the projects but are unable to take into account 
longer-term perspectives and key uncertainties. 
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Conflict 
location Country 
Key 
resource 
Valuation 
issues 
discussed 
Corporate 
liabilities 
involved? 
Are valuation 
issues properly 
addressed by 
authorities?  What is needed then? 
Niger 
Delta 
Nigeria Oil extraction 
Liabilities, 
restoration 
costs 
Yes, but not 
paid yet 
No: only partial 
studies available 
Generally speaking: a 
participative/ deliberative 
MCE and a rigorous EIA 
of the project taking into 
account the entire regions 
at stake 
Yasuní Ecuador Oil extraction MCE 
Yes, but not 
paid yet 
No: no adequate 
evaluation 
available 
São 
Francisco 
River 
Brazil 
Water 
megaproject 
EIA Not yet 
No: insufficient 
EIA 
N.A. India 
Forest, tree 
plantations 
NPV 
Compensatory 
scheme 
No: reductionist 
approach 
Mount Ida Turkey Gold mining 
Valuation 
languages 
Not yet 
No: insufficient 
EIA 
Akkuyu & 
Belene 
Turkey& 
Bulgaria 
Nuclear plant CBA Not yet 
No: reductionist 
approach 
 
Table 15: Summary of the case studies. 
This is not so surprising when one thinks of the deeply political and 
multidimensional nature of any evaluation process. A government aggressively 
promoting a given ‘development project’ – as it is generally the case – has little 
incentive to undertake a thoroughly deliberative and transparent multicriteria 
evaluation that may very well put in doubt its legitimacy. This also applies to cases 
where there are private investments involved and even more so when there is a 
corporate liability assessment undertaken. 
It has become part of the mainstream discourse that environmental issues are 
best handled with the participation of the concerned citizens. Indeed, any 
discussions about economic and environmental issues virtually always involve 
confrontation with a diversity of objectives and interests that are expressed in a 
variety of languages of valuation. If participation is to be taken seriously –which is 
too rarely the case –, EJOs should develop/support communication frameworks 
that allow combining (‘objective’) scientific validity and the ability to take into 
account multiple (‘subjective’) value standpoints. How would such a framework 
look like? 
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9.2 Towards an integrated approach to valuation:   
the four fold framework45 
Together with an increasing number of social scientists, we strongly believe in the 
relevance of ‘integrative approaches’. An integrative approach to valuation is more 
exigent than an ‘interdisciplinary’ one and it represents the needed opposite of a 
reductionist methodology (e.g. focusing on monetary valuation only). Such an 
integrative approach must find a complementarity between, on the one hand, an 
understanding of the feasibility of a given project embedded in a given socio-
ecological system and, on the other, an understanding of the criteria of desirability 
for feasible courses of action. 
9.2.1 Feasibility 
The feasibility aspects of a given ‘development project’ (whether agricultural, 
industrial, service-oriented or extractive) can be tackled by a scientific approach. 
The latter may entail various forms of system representations, simulation 
modelling, and so on, regarding the economic (e.g. technological capacities) and 
ecological dimensions (e.g. showing patterns of water use and greenhouse gas 
emissions). Such integrated appraisals have become a major activity of 
interdisciplinary policy-relevant research endeavour. 
Broadly speaking, resource management must fulfil two complementary functions. 
The first is the delivery of economic welfare in the narrow sense, through 
production of economic goods and services; the second is the maintenance of the 
ecological welfare base through assuring reproduction or enhancement of critical 
environmental functions. In this second sense, ‘sustainability’ objectives can be 
thought of as responding to a kind of social demand for the maintenance of key 
environmental functions. 
As we have seen continuously within EJOLT, this social demand for 
environmental quality (and for assuring fairness toward future generations) cannot 
easily be reduced to simple monetary values. Rather, scenarios that explore 
different conceivable co-evolutions of ecological and socioeconomic systems need 
to be formulated and evaluated from various points of view (see e.g. Gerber et al., 
2013, EJOLT Report No. 8). These viewpoints include scientific preoccupations 
and also societal preoccupations that can be summarized in the key question: 
sustainability of what, and for whom? 
This key question is relevant for each one of the case studiespresented in this 
report. In some cases such as gold mining in Turkey or water diverting in Brazil, 
the economic and ecological scientific analyses have been inadequate. It is not 
clear if lower-income sectors will benefit at all or if they will simply have to bear the 
costs. When environmental impact assessments are carried out, they often lack 
an ‘equity’ dimension and they do not encompass the entire region at stake. 
 
 
 
45
   The next sections draw heavily on O’Connor (2002; 2007). See also O’Connor and Martínez-Alier 
(1998). 
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9.2.2 Desirability 
The social choice side is to decide what might be desirable within the bounds of 
the feasible. Abstractly, this takes on the form of an arbitrage between different 
interests. As O’Connor (2002) pointed out, “in the context of environmental 
valuation problematics, this [arbitrage] in turn can be seen as one aspect of a 
more generalized structural opposition – between ‘us’ and the ‘others’, between 
self-interest and interest in the livelihoods of others, between human and 
nonhuman communities, between ‘our’ culture (whichever it is) and other cultures, 
and so on. The variety of candidate sustainability ethics that, over the years, have 
been put forward, tend indeed to turn around this time-honored problem of 
reconciling concern for oneself with a consideration for the other(s)”. 
This suggests that two forms of social information or representation will have 
special pertinence for a deliberative approach to resource valuation and 
governance: (i) local-level individual and community information: that is, the 
immediate life experience of ‘ordinary’ members of society, in their homes, 
workplaces, farms, shops, schools, with friends, and on their travels; and (ii) 
political and institutional information: the terms in which the regulation of human 
action is conceived, that link local and economic and ecological information to 
frameworks of collective purpose, responsibilities, conflicts, and policy. 
In the present report, it appears that local-level knowledge is crucial. This is for 
instance obvious in the case of the Yasuní or in India’s forest management. Local 
population know better than ‘experts’ that they depend of forest resources for their 
daily life and that ‘tree plantations are not forests’ in this respect. In Ecuador, on 
one hand the institutional framework – through the rights of Nature incorporated in 
the Constitution – can be supportive of local struggles, but on the other, the power 
structure so heavily dependent on oil may undermine popular mobilizations. 
The above formulation thus distinguishes four basic dimensions of information: (1) 
ecological and (2) economic systems information, (3) local-level individual and 
community knowledge and values, and (4) political or institutional framing 
information. As O’Connor puts it, “these may be considered as irreducible 
dimensions for building a good representation of an environmental issue”. 
9.2.3 Criteria and indicators 
In order to be able to deal with this fourfold model, an adequate set of indicators 
must be developed to shed light on the kind of decision or institutional 
arrangement that are needed for the pursuit of the sustainability goals within a 
social justice framework. Prospects for framing and promoting sustainability policy 
choices as collective and concerted actions can, we suggest, be enhanced 
through bringing the different scales of information and different stakeholder 
perspectives into constructive confrontation with each other. At a scientific level, 
this means establishing ‘bridges’ between representations at different levels of 
aggregation or based on varied conceptual frameworks. At the socio-political level, 
it means building the capacities for mutual understanding of the contrasting 
perspectives and preoccupations of different stakeholders, in order to search for 
points of common ground. 
Four basic dimensions 
of information: (1) 
ecological and (2) 
economic systems 
information, (3) local-
level individual and 
community 
knowledge and 
values, and (4) 
political or 
institutional framing 
information. 
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9.3 Valuation as a political process:  
The need for deliberation 
Conflicts of interests, valuation languages contests, uncertainties, and dissent 
amongst scientists, as well as governance challenges, can be explored by cross-
comparison of different scenarios about what would happen with or without to-be-
defined ‘development projects’ and the corresponding institutional arrangements. 
One set of scenarios would typically be trend-based or business-oriented 
projections, which generally involve trends in resource use that are unsustainable. 
Other scenarios would then be constructed that involve the satisfaction of specific 
sustainable use criteria, on the basis of various hypotheses about systems 
potentials and about social choices of ‘what, and for whom?’. 
This multicriteria style of scenario-based evaluation can be seen as an extension 
of the well-known fundamental inseparability of allocative (efficiency) and 
distributional (equity) goals. Three remarks at this point: 
 When the long-term future is taken into account, inter-temporal distributional 
considerations will predominate over allocative efficiency. 
 Substantive attention must be given to inter-group and intra-generational 
distribution issues. This is done through the analysis of the incompatibilities 
between the diverse sustainability concerns expressed by the different 
stakeholders (O’Connor and Martínez-Alier, 1998). 
 The unavoidable normative dimension of any valuation process is reflected 
in the way in which scenarios are formulated with respect to social, 
economic, and ecological sustainability. The values entailed in the different 
scenario must be clear (see Myrdal’s urge for ‘explicit value premises’, 
1932). 
Having established the general conceptual orientation, the next task is to design 
an institutional and deliberative context. Information about interests and priorities 
can be built and debated in what O’Connor has called a ‘theatre of sustainability’. 
A stakeholder concertation process can be developed that integrates systems 
science with deliberation in a recursive cycle as follows. The representation of an 
iterative loop is intended to emphasize the real-time process of putting on to the 
scene interests, knowledge, disagreements, and possible solutions: the first step 
in the cycle privileges the desirability (or social choice) preoccupations at the 
stakeholder level; the next step privileges the feasibility aspect of analysis; and the 
last step again privileges the social choice problem, this time also at the 
governance level. The deliberation process includes both formalized and ‘informal’ 
knowledge, the latter being typically held by members of local networks and 
communities. Interactive stakeholder-linked approaches imply the need to present 
and discuss scientific and socioeconomic findings to interest groups with a range 
of different interests, on a permanent (recursive) basis. It is here that frameworks 
such as SMCE or Integraal can be very useful (see Gerber et al., 2013, EJOLT 
Report No. 8). Such frameworks are instruments that provide opportunities for 
discussing, learning, understanding, convincing, and that may strengthen EJO 
activists side by highlighting the virtue and solidity of their viewpoints. 
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9.4 Conclusion 
The resolution of environmental resource management problems means dealing 
incessantly with ethical and political choices, and this makes calculation, 
measurement, and technical expertise on their own insufficient. Decision quality 
and socially legitimate processes can be assured only through integrating 
scientific, technical, and economic expertise within a permanent stakeholder 
communication process, in order to search for a reasonable common ground. 
However, there will evidently be many situations in which people, or different 
cultures, or different species of plants and animals, simply cannot, or do not want 
to, find a basis for durable coexistence. Therefore, reflective deliberation, as 
advocated here, may work to highlight appreciation of tensions, but it does not 
necessarily find a way to put an end to them. If one party does not want to seek 
out some form of coexistence, it may be because it holds an ethic of exclusion or 
domination. Or it may be that the differing experiences of the coexisting parties 
are incomparable, being grounded in different existential conditions and in 
different ethical and epistemological postulates that, each in their own terms, are 
somehow reasonable. As O’Connor (2002) puts it: 
The “coexistence” ideal of a dignified compromise does not mean finding, by some 
magical process of option creation, a win-win outcome in which everyone takes 
away from the negotiating table a large part of what they came to bargain for. 
Rather, it means reciprocal consideration, the acceptance of sacrifices in a spirit of 
coexistence, and the ability to refine and change one’s personal (or group, or 
national) goals in the interests of the wider community. 
The “coexistence” 
ideal of a dignified 
compromise means 
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of the wider 
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More than sixty years ago, the eco-institutional economist K. Willian Kapp 
published a critique of the misleading character of economic valuation in terms of 
market prices, a critique that he developed into the ‘theory of social costs’
46
 (Kapp, 
[1950] 1978).There, he focused on capitalism as an institutional system that, 
rather than leading to the classical harmony of interests, repeatedly generates a 
privatisation of benefits and a socialisation of costs. He added that capitalism can 
essentially be seenas an economy of unpaid social and environmental costs (see 
also Steppacher et al., 1977; Elsner et al., 2006; 2011; Gerber and Steppacher, 
2012).The problem of valuation is therefore especially central in this context, and 
particularly for ‘anti-systemic’ actors such as EJOs. Kapp’s answer was to develop 
an objectivization of social and ecological disruption through the elaboration of 
minimum standards, welfare criteria, and the use of a variety of social-ecological 
indicators. Kapp was aware of the technical and political difficulties involved in 
using socio-ecological standards and insisted on keeping the mopen for 
modification in the light of new experiences and political processes. But overall, 
his answer remains entirely correct. 
In virtually every socio-environmental conflict, a variety of languages of valuation 
is deployed (Martínez-Alier, 2002). This variety reflects the multidimensionality of 
such struggles. The inclusion of multiple valuation languages is particularly 
important since governments and companies usually try to portray socio-
environmental impacts solely as a technical problem that will be handled with the 
proper use of technology or monetary accounting. In fact, contrary to what is 
sometimes said, most of the case studies in this report show that lower-income 
sectors (especially indigenous people and peasants) do not simply seek a 
monetary compensation. At Mount Ida for example, lower-income groups consider 
that the burden of the environmental impacts will fall on them and tend to reject 
 
 
46
   The astonishing fact that most of the discussion on social costs is based on Ronald Coase, 
ignoring entirely the earlier and fundamental contribution of Kapp, is discussed in Berger (2011). 
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the mining project. The relatively well-off, on the other hand, are likely to support it 
in expectation of new business and employment opportunities. In Ecuador, 
indigenous people are at the forefront of the battle for ‘leaving oil in the soil’ and a 
recent poll suggests that three quarters of the Ecuadorian are actually behind 
them. These results show that ‘popular sectors’ do worry about local 
environmental matters, even more so, sometimes, than higher income groups. In 
many cases therefore, monetary compensation is likely not going to be sufficient 
to resolve disagreements. More fundamentally, these valuation contests also 
highlight opposite visions about local development between on one hand (lower-
income) locals and on the other, the state and the corporate sector. 
In view of the differences in material interests, values and perceptions, it may be 
inferred that the evolution of these conflicts will very much depend on the extent to 
which different languages of valuation are acknowledged and addressed. 
Generally speaking, this would require, firstly, carrying out a rigorous socio-
environmental impacts assessment of the region at stake, and secondly, 
undertaking an in-depth deliberative multicriteria evaluation. As Avcı et al. (in this 
report) aptly put it, “Undoubtedly, in a society where power relations were more 
equally-distributed among actors, it would be easier to explicitly recognise all 
these different languages. Still, it is clear that the state may arrive at a legitimate 
decision only through participatory and deliberative mechanisms that acknowledge 
and address these issues”. 
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